Existential philosophies, then, insist upon asking questions about self
and the world, taking care at the same time to insist that they are
unanswerable.[f]
Beyond this point of frustration these philosophies cannot go. The
Buddha, too, insists that questions about self and the world are
unanswerable, either by refusing to answer them[g] or by indicating that no statement about self and the world can be justified.[h]
But -- and here is the vital difference -- the Buddha can and does go
beyond this point: not, to be sure, by answering the unanswerable, but
by showing the way leading to the final cessation of all questions about
self and the world.[i][j]
Let there be no mistake in the matter: the existential philosophies are
not a substitute for the Buddha's Teaching -- for which, indeed, there
can be no substitute.[k] The questions that they persist in asking are the questions of a puthujjana, of a 'commoner', and though they see that they are unanswerable they have no alternative
but to go on asking them; for the tacit assumption upon which all these
philosophies rest is that the questions are valid.
They are faced with an ambiguity that they cannot resolve.[m] The Buddha, on the other hand, sees that the questions are not valid and that to ask them is to make the mistake of assuming that they are. One who has understood the Buddha's Teaching no longer asks these questions; he is ariya, 'noble', and no more a puthujjana, and he is beyond the range of the existential philosophies; but he would never have reached the point of listening to the Buddha's Teaching had he not first been disquieted by existential questions about himself and the world. There is no suggestion, of course, that it is necessary to become an existentialist philosopher before one can understand the Buddha: every intelligent man questions himself quite naturally about the nature and significance of his own existence, and provided he refuses to be satisfied with the first ready-made answer that he is offered he is as well placed as anyone to grasp the Buddha's Teaching when he hears it.
[g] Ekam antam nisinno kho Vacchagotto paribbājako Bhagavantam etad avoca. Kin nu kho bho Gotama, atth'attā ti. Evam vutte Bhagavā tunhī ahosi. Kim pana bho Gotama, n'atth'attā ti. Dutiyam pi kho Bhagavā tunhī ahosi. Atha kho Vacchagotto paribbājako utthāyāsanā pakkāmi. ('Being seated at one side, the wanderer Vacchagotta said to the Auspicious One, -- How is it, master Gotama, does self exist? When this was said the Auspicious One was silent. -- How then, master Gotama, does self not exist? A second time, too, the Auspicious One was silent. Then the wanderer Vacchagotta got up from his seat and went away.') Avyākata Samy. 10 <S.iv,400>
[h] Tatra bhikkhave ye te samanabrāhmanā evamvādino evamditthino, Sassato attā ca loko ca [Asassato attā ca loko ca (and so on)], idam eva saccam mogham aññan ti, tesam vata aññatr'eva saddhāya aññatra ruciyā aññatra anussavā aññatra ākāraparivitakkā aññatra ditthinijjhānakkhantiyā paccattam yeva ñānam bhavissati parisuddham pariyodātan ti n'etam thānam vijjati. ('Therein, monks, those recluses and divines whose belief and view is thus, 'Self and the world are eternal [Self and the world are non-eternal (and so on)], just this is truth and all else foolishness', -- that other merely than faith, other than preference, other than tradition, other than excogitation, other than acquiescent meditation of a (wrong) view, they should have private knowledge, purified and cleansed, such a thing is not possible.') Majjhima xi,2 <M.ii,234>
[i] Tayidam sankhatam olārikam, atthi kho pana sankhārānam nirodho, Atth'etan ti. Iti viditvā tassa nissaranadassāvī Tathāgato tad upātivatto. Ibid. ('This is determined and coarse; but there is such a thing as cessation of determinations -- that there is. Knowing thus, and seeing the escape, the Tathāgata passes beyond.It is for this reason that the Ariya Dhamma is called lokuttara, 'beyond the world'.')
The Blessed One was once living at Savatthl in Jeta's Grove. A deity called Rohitassa came to him late in the night, paid homage to him and asked: "Lord, the world's end where one neither is born nor ages nor dies nor passes away nor reappears: is it possible to know or see or reach that by travelling there?"
They are faced with an ambiguity that they cannot resolve.[m] The Buddha, on the other hand, sees that the questions are not valid and that to ask them is to make the mistake of assuming that they are. One who has understood the Buddha's Teaching no longer asks these questions; he is ariya, 'noble', and no more a puthujjana, and he is beyond the range of the existential philosophies; but he would never have reached the point of listening to the Buddha's Teaching had he not first been disquieted by existential questions about himself and the world. There is no suggestion, of course, that it is necessary to become an existentialist philosopher before one can understand the Buddha: every intelligent man questions himself quite naturally about the nature and significance of his own existence, and provided he refuses to be satisfied with the first ready-made answer that he is offered he is as well placed as anyone to grasp the Buddha's Teaching when he hears it.
[g] Ekam antam nisinno kho Vacchagotto paribbājako Bhagavantam etad avoca. Kin nu kho bho Gotama, atth'attā ti. Evam vutte Bhagavā tunhī ahosi. Kim pana bho Gotama, n'atth'attā ti. Dutiyam pi kho Bhagavā tunhī ahosi. Atha kho Vacchagotto paribbājako utthāyāsanā pakkāmi. ('Being seated at one side, the wanderer Vacchagotta said to the Auspicious One, -- How is it, master Gotama, does self exist? When this was said the Auspicious One was silent. -- How then, master Gotama, does self not exist? A second time, too, the Auspicious One was silent. Then the wanderer Vacchagotta got up from his seat and went away.') Avyākata Samy. 10 <S.iv,400>
[h] Tatra bhikkhave ye te samanabrāhmanā evamvādino evamditthino, Sassato attā ca loko ca [Asassato attā ca loko ca (and so on)], idam eva saccam mogham aññan ti, tesam vata aññatr'eva saddhāya aññatra ruciyā aññatra anussavā aññatra ākāraparivitakkā aññatra ditthinijjhānakkhantiyā paccattam yeva ñānam bhavissati parisuddham pariyodātan ti n'etam thānam vijjati. ('Therein, monks, those recluses and divines whose belief and view is thus, 'Self and the world are eternal [Self and the world are non-eternal (and so on)], just this is truth and all else foolishness', -- that other merely than faith, other than preference, other than tradition, other than excogitation, other than acquiescent meditation of a (wrong) view, they should have private knowledge, purified and cleansed, such a thing is not possible.') Majjhima xi,2 <M.ii,234>
[i] Tayidam sankhatam olārikam, atthi kho pana sankhārānam nirodho, Atth'etan ti. Iti viditvā tassa nissaranadassāvī Tathāgato tad upātivatto. Ibid. ('This is determined and coarse; but there is such a thing as cessation of determinations -- that there is. Knowing thus, and seeing the escape, the Tathāgata passes beyond.It is for this reason that the Ariya Dhamma is called lokuttara, 'beyond the world'.')
[j] It is all the fashion nowadays to hail modern science as the vindication of the Buddha's anattā
doctrine. Here is an example from a recent book: 'This voidness of
selfhood, which forms the distinguishing feature of the Buddhist
analysis of being, is a view that is fully in accord with the
conclusions drawn by modern scientific thinkers who have arrived at it
independently.'[k]
The supposition is that the Buddha solved the question of self and the
world simply by anticipating and adopting the impersonal attitude of
scientific objectivity. The seasoned thinker is not likely to be delayed
by this sort of thing, but the beginner is easily misled.
[k] To arrive at the Buddha's Teaching independently is to become a Buddha oneself. N'atthi kho ito bahiddhā añño samano vā brāhmano vā yo evam bhūtam taccham tatham dhammam deseti yathā Bhagavā. ('Outside
here there is no other recluse or divine who sets forth as the
Auspicious One does so real and factual and justified a Teaching.')
Indriya Samy. vi,3 <S.v,230>
Nanavira Thera (from Preface)
The Blessed One was once living at Savatthl in Jeta's Grove. A deity called Rohitassa came to him late in the night, paid homage to him and asked: "Lord, the world's end where one neither is born nor ages nor dies nor passes away nor reappears: is it possible to know or see or reach that by travelling there?"
"Friend, that there is a world's
end where one neither is born nor
ages nor dies nor passes away nor
reappears, which is to be known or
seen or reached by travelling
there—that I do not say. Yet I do not
say that there is ending of
suffering without reaching the world's
end. Rather it is in this
fathom-long carcass with its perceptions and
its mind that I
describe the world, the origin of the world, the cessation of the
world, and the way leading to the cessation of the world.
"It is utterly impossible
To reach by walking the world's end;
But none escape from suffering
Unless the world's end has been
reached.
"It is a Sage, a knower of the
world,
Who gets to the world's end, and it is
he
By whom the holy life has been lived
out;
In knowing the world's end he is at
peace
And hopes for neither this world nor
the next."
S. 2:36; A. 4:46
Once too the wanderer Uttiya went to
the Blessed One, and
after greeting him, he sat down at one side.
Then he asked: "How
is it, Master Gotama, the world is eternal:
is only that the truth and
everything else wrong?"—"That
is not answered by me, Uttiya."—
"Then the world is not
eternal: is only that the truth and everything
else wrong?"—"That
too is not answered by me, Uttiya."—"The
world is
finite: is only that the truth and everything else wrong?"—
"That too is not answered by me, Uttiya."—"Then the
world is infinite: is only that the truth and everything else
wrong?"—"That too
is not answered by me, Uttiya."—"The
soul is the same as the body:
is only that the truth and everything
else wrong?"—"That too is
not answered by me,
Uttiya."—"Then the soul is one and the body
another: is
only that the truth and everything else wrong?"—"That
too is not answered by me, Uttiya."—"After death a
Perfect One is:
is only that the truth and everything else
wrong?"—"That too is not
answered by me, Uttiya."—"Then
after death a Perfect One is not:
is only that the truth and
everything else wrong?"—"That too is not
answered by me,
Uttiya."—"Then after death a Perfect One both
is and is
not: is only that the truth and everything else wrong?"—
"That too is not answered by me, Uttiya."—"Then
after death a Per
fect One neither is nor is not: is only that the
truth and everything
else wrong?"—"That too is not
answered by me, Uttiya."
"But why does Master Gotama
decline to answer when I ask him
these questions? What then is
answered by Master Gotama?"
"I teach the Dhamma to
disciples from direct knowledge, Uttiya,
for purification of beings,
for surmounting sorrow and lamentation,
for ending pain and grief,
for attainment of the true goal, for realizing
Nibbana."
"Master Gotama, does that Dhamma
provide an outlet from suffering for all the world, or for half, or
for a third?"
When this was said, the Blessed One remained
silent.
Then the venerable Ananda thought: "The
wanderer Uttiya
must not conceive any such pernicious view as ' W h
e n the monk
Gotama is asked a question peculiar to me and to no one
else and
he founders and does not answer, is it because he is
unable?' That
would be long for his harm and suffering." So he
said to him:
"Friend Uttiya, I shall give you a simile; for
some wise men here get
to know through a simile the meaning of what
is said. Suppose a
king had a city with strong ditches, ramparts and
bastions, and a
single gate, and he had a wise, clever, sagacious
gate-keeper there
who stopped those w h o m he did not know and
admitted only those
whom he knew; and since he had himself gone
round the path encircling the city and had seen no gaps in the
ramparts or any hole even
big enough for a cat to pass through, he
might conclude that living
beings above a certain size must go in
and out through the gate—so
too, friend Uttiya, a Perfect O n e '
s concern is not that 'All the world
shall find an outlet by this,
or a half, or a third,' but rather that
'Whoever has found or finds
or will find an outlet from the world
of suffering, that is always
done by abandoning the five hindrances
(of desire for sensuality,
ill will, lethargy-and-drowsiness, agitation-
and-worry, and
uncertainty), defilements that weaken understanding, and by
maintaining in being the seven factors of enlightenment
with minds
well established on the four foundations of mindfulness.' Your
question which you put to the Blessed One was framed
in the wrong
way; that was why the Blessed One did not answer it."
A.
10:95
"Lord, 'right view, right view' is
said. What does 'right view' refer to?"—"Usually,
Kaccayana, this world depends upon the dualism of existence and
non-existence. But when one sees the world's origin as it actually is
with right understanding, there is for him none of (what is called)
non-existence in the world; and when he sees the world's cessation as
it actually is with right understanding, there is for him none of
(what is called) existence in the world.
"Usually the world is shackled by
bias, clinging and insistence; but one such as this (who has right
view), instead of allowing bias, instead of clinging, and instead of
deciding about 'my self,' with such bias, such clinging, and such
mental decision in the guise of underlying tendency to insist, he has
no doubt or uncertainty that what arises is only arising suffering,
and what ceases is only ceasing suffering, and in this his knowledge
is independent of others. That is what 'right view' refers to. '(An)
all exists' is one extreme; '(an) all does not exist' is the other
extreme. Instead of resorting to either extreme, a Perfect One
expounds the Dhamma by the middle way: 'It is with ignorance as
condition that determinations come to be; with determinations as
condition, consciousness; with consciousness ...' with consciousness
as condition, name-and-form; with name-and-form as condition, the
sixfold base; with the sixfold base as condition, contact; with
contact as condition, feeling; with feeling as condition, craving;
with craving as condition, clinging; with clinging as condition,
being; with being as condition, birth; with birth as condition ageing
and death come to be, and also sorrow and lamentation, pain, grief
and despair; that is how there is an origin to this whole aggregate
mass of suffering." But with cessation of ignorance there is
cessation of determinations; with cessation of determinations,
cessation of consciousness; with cessation of consciousness,
cessation of name-and-form; with cessation of name-and-form,
cessation of the sixfold base; with cessation of the sixfold base,
cessation of contact; with cessation of contact, cessation of
feeling; with cessation of feeling, cessation of craving; with
cessation of craving, cessation of clinging; with cessation of
clinging, cessation of being; with cessation of being, cessation of
birth; with cessation of birth, ageing and death cease, and also
sorrow and lamentation, pain, grief and despair; that is how there is
a cessation to this whole aggregate mass of suffering."S. 12:15
"That in the world by which one
perceives the world and conceives
conceits about the world is called
'the world' in the Noble One's Discipline. And what is it in the
world with which one does that? It is
with the eye, ear, nose,
tongue, body, and mind."
S. 35:116
"It is being worn away (lujjati),
that is why it is called 'the world'
(Ioka) S. 35:82
" 'Void world, void world' is
said, Lord; in what way is 'void world'
said?"—"It is
because of what is void of self and selfs property that
'void world'
is said, Ananda. And what is void of self and selfs property? The eye
... forms ... eye-consciousness ... eye-contact... any feeling ...
born of eye-contact ... The ear, etc ....
"The nose, etc ....
The tongue, etc .... The body, etc .... The mind,
etc .... any
feeling whether pleasant, painful or neither-painful-nor-
pleasant
born of mind-contact is void of self and selfs property."
S.
35:85
RŪPA
In the Kevaddhasutta (Dīgha i,11 <D.i,223>), it is said that the question 'Where do the four mahābhūtā finally cease?' is wrongly asked, and that the question should be 'Where do [the four mahābhūtā] get no footing? Where do nāma and rūpa finally cease?' Matter or substance (rūpa) is essentially inertia or resistance (see Dīgha ii,2 <D.ii,62>[9]), or as the four mahābhūtā it can be regarded as four kinds of behaviour (i.e. the four primary patterns of inertia—see NĀMA).
Behaviour (or inertia) is independent of the particular
sense-experience that happens to be exhibiting it: a message in the
Morse code (which would be a certain complex mode of behaviour) could be
received in any sense-experience (though seeing and hearing
are the most usual). In any one kind of sense-experience there is
revealed a vast set of various behaviours, of various patterns of
inertia; and in any other contemporary sense-experience there is
revealed a set that, to a great extent, corresponds to this first set.[a] (One particular group of behaviours common to all my sense-experiences is of especial significance—it is 'this body', ayam kāyo rūpī catummahābhūtiko ('this body composed of matter, of the four great entities') [Majjhima viii,5 <M.i,500>].) Thus, when I see a bird opening its beak at intervals I can often at the same time hear
a corresponding sound, and I say that it is the (visible) bird that is
(audibly) singing. The fact that there seems to be one single (though
elaborate) set of behaviours common to all my sense-experiences at any
one time, and not an entirely different set for each sense, gives rise
to the notion of one single material world revealed indifferently by any
one of my senses. Furthermore, the material world of one individual
largely corresponds to that of another (particularly if allowance is
made for difference in point of view), and we arrive at the wider notion
of one general material world common to all individuals.[b]
The fact that a given mode of behaviour can be common to
sense-experiences of two or more different kinds shows that it is
independent of any one particular kind of consciousness (unlike a given
perception—blue, for example, which is deppendent upon eye-consciousness
and not upon ear-consciousness or the others); and being independent of
any one particular kind of consciousness it is independent of all consciousness except for its presence or existence. One mode of behaviour can be distinguished from another, and in order that this can be done they must exist—they must be present either in reality or in imagination, they must be cognized.
But since it makes no difference in what form they are present—whether
as sights or sounds (and even with one as visible and one as audible,
and one real and one imaginary)—, the difference between them is not a
matter of consciousness.[c] Behaviour, then, in itself does not involve consciousness (as perception does), and the rūpakkhandha is not phassapaccayā (as the saññākkhandha is)—see Majjhima xi,9 <M.iii,17>. In itself, purely as inertia or behaviour, matter cannot be said to exist. (Cf. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 212.) And if it cannot be said to exist it cannot be said to cease. Thus the question 'Where do the four mahābhūtā finally cease?' is improper. (The question will have been asked with the notion in mind of an existing
general material world common to all. Such a general world could only
exist—and cease—if there were a general consciousness common to all. But
this is a contradiction, since consciousness and individuality [see SAKKĀYA] are one.) But behaviour can get a footing in existence by being present in some form. As rūpa in nāmarūpa, the four mahābhūtā get a borrowed existence as the behaviour of appearance (just as feeling, perception, and intentions, get a borrowed substance as the appearance of behaviour). And nāmarūpa is the condition for viññāna as viññāna is for nāmarūpa. When viññāna (q.v.) is anidassana it is said to have ceased (since avijjā has ceased). Thus, with cessation of viññāna there is cessation of nāmarūpa, and the four mahābhūtā no longer get a footing in existence. (The passage at Salāyatana Samyutta xix,8 <S.iv,192>, ...bhikkhu catunnam mahābhūtānam samudayañ ca atthagamañ ca yathābhūtam pajānāti,
('...a monk understands as they really are the arising and ceasing of
the four great entities') is to be understood in this sense.)
From the foregoing discussion it can be seen that in order to distinguish rūpa from nāma
it is only necessary to separate what is (or could be) common to two or
more kinds of consciousness from what is not. But care is needed. It
might seem that shape is rūpa and not nāma
since it is present in both eye-consciousness and body-consciousness
(e.g. touching with the fingers). This, however, is a mistake. Vision is
a double faculty: it cognizes both colour and shape (see FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE §§I/4 & II/8). The eye touches what it sees
(it is only necessary to run the eye first across and then down some
vertical lines or bars to discover this), and the result is coloured shapes.
The eye is capable of intentional movement more delicate even than the
fingers, and the corresponding perception of shapes is even more
subtle.[d]
Similar considerations apply, though in a much lesser degree, to
hearing (and even to taste and to smell) where perception of shape, when
present (however vaguely), corresponds to movement, real or imaginary
(which will include the directional effect of two ears), of the head or
of the entire body.[e]
But provided different kinds of consciousness are adequately
distinguished, this method gives a definite criterion for telling what
is matter from what is not. It is consequently not necessary to look for
strict analysis of the four mahābhūtā: provided only that our
idea of them conforms to this criterion, and that they cover all the
primary modes of matter, this is all that is needed. Thus it is not
necessary to look beyond the passage at Majjhima xiv,10
<M.iii,240> for a definition of them. (It is easy, but fatal, to
assume that the Buddha's Teaching is concerned with analysis for its own
sake, and then to complain that the analysis is not pushed far enough.)
A human body in action, clearly enough, will present a behaviour that
is a highly complex combination of these primary modes: it is behaviour
of behaviour, but it still does not get beyond behaviour. (It is
important to note that the laws of science—of biochemistry and physics
in particular—do not cover behaviour (i.e. matter) associated with conscious [intentional] action.)[f] Nanavira Thera
Footnotes:
[a] Mind-experience is not considered in this Note to avoid complication. It is not, however, essentially different. See MANO [c].
[b] Natural
science, in taking this concept as its starting-point and polishing it a
little to remove irregularities, has no place for the individual and
his sense-experience (let alone mind-experience or imagination); for the
material world of science is by definition utterly without point of view (in relativity theory every point is a point of view, which comes to the same thing), it is uniformly and quite indifferently communal—it is essentially public>.
Consciousness, intention, perception, and feeling, not being public,
are not a part of the universe of science. Science is inherently
incapable of understanding the nature of material change due to
conscious action—which is, concisely, reflexive exercise of preference
for one available mode of behaviour (or set of them) at the expense of
the others. (Quantum physics, in hoping to reinstate the 'observer'—even
if only as a point of view—, is merely locking the stable door after
the horse has been stolen.)
[c] A
visual and an auditive experience differ in consciousness (whether or
not they differ in matter); but between two different visual (or
auditive) experiences the difference is in matter (or substance, or
inertia) and not in consciousness. [At this point the question might be
asked, 'What is the material difference between the simple
experiences of, for example, a blue thing and a red thing (ignoring
spatial extension)?' The immediate answer is that they are simply different things, i.e. different inertias. But if it is insisted that one inertia can only differ from another in behaviour (i.e. in pattern
of inertia)—in other words, that no inertia is absolutely simple—, we
shall perhaps find the answer in the idea of a difference in frequency. But this would involve us in discussion of an order of structure underlying the four mahābhūtā. See FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE
[j].] Thus it will be observed that all difference in appearance (nāma) is difference in either consciousness (viññāna) or matter (rūpa). Why is this? Neither consciousness nor matter, by itself, can appear (or be manifest); for consciousness by itself lacks substance or specification—it is pure presence or existence without any thing
that is present (or exists)—, and matter by itself lacks presence or
existence—it is pure substance or specification, of which one cannot say
'it is' (i.e. 'it is present [or absent]'). Appearance or manifestation must necessarily partake of both consciousness and matter, but as an overlapping ()
and not simply an addition (for the simple superposition of two things
each itself incapable of appearing would not produce appearance).
Appearance is existence as substance, or substance as existence, and there must be also
simple existence (or consciousness) and simple substance (or matter) to
support this imbrication. Appearance, in a manner of speaking, is sandwiched between consciousness and matter: there must be rūpa, and nāma, and viññāna ().
(There is more to be said about this, but not briefly.) It is because
of this structure that all differences in appearance can be resolved
into differences either of consciousness or of matter (or both).
[d]
Strictly, the shapes are there before the eyeball is moved, just as the
hand perceives the shape of an object merely by resting on it; movement
of the eyeball, as of the fingers, only confirms the perception and
makes it explicit. This does not matter: we are concerned only to point
out the similarity of the eye and the hand as both yielding perceptions
of shape, not to give an account of such perceptions.
[e] This discussion, it will be seen, makes space a secondary and not a primary quality (see NĀMA [d]): space is essentially tactile
(in a wide sense), and is related to the body (as organ of touch) as
colours and sounds (and so on) are related to the eye and the
ear—indeed, we should do better to think of 'spaces' rather than of any
absolute 'space'. Space, in fact, has no right to its privileged
position opposite time as one of the joint basic determinants of matter:
we are no more entitled to speak of 'space-(&-)time' than we are of
'smell-(&-)time'. Time itself is not absolute (see PATICCASAMUPPĀDA [c] & FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE §II/5),
and material things, as they exist, are not 'in' time (like floatage on
a river), but rather have time as their characteristic; space, however,
besides not being absolute, is not, strictly, even a characteristic of
matter. On the other hand, our first four sense-organs are each a part
of the body, which is the fifth, and space does hold a
privileged position relative to colour, sound, smell, and taste. Thus we
sometimes find in the Suttas (e.g. Majjhima vii,2 <M.i,423>) an ākāsadhātu alongside the four mahābhūtā;
and for practical purposes—which is ultimately all we are concerned
with—space can be regarded as a quasi-material element. But the
Milindapañha has no business whatever to put ākāsa together with nibbāna as asankhata.
[f] Pace Russell: 'Physical things are those series of appearances whose matter obeys the laws of physics'. Op. cit., VIIIth Essay, §xi.
Scandal of philosophy
The reader is referred to Sartre's excellent discussion of this equivocal concept (op. cit., pp. 372-8), of which we can give here only the peroration. 'La
sensation, notion hybride entre le subjectif et l'objectif, conçue à
partir de l'objet, et appliquée ensuite au sujet, existence bâtarde dont
on ne saurait dire si elle est de fait ou de droit, la sensation est
une pure rêverie de psychologue, il faut la rejeter délibérément de
toute théorie sérieuse sur les rapports de la conscience et du monde.'
('Sensation, hybrid notion between the subjective and the objective,
conceived starting from the object, and then applied to the subject,
bastard entity of which one cannot say whether it is de facto or de jure,—sensation
is a pure psychologist's day-dream: it must be deliberately rejected
from every serious theory on the relations of consciousness [which, for
Sartre, is subjectivity] and the world.') Descartes, it seems, with his
'representative ideas', is the modern philosopher primarily responsible
for the present tangle—see Heidegger, op. cit., p. 200 et seq.
(Heidegger quotes Kant as saying that it is 'a scandal of philosophy
and of human reason in general' that there is still no cogent proof for
the 'being-there of things outside us' that will do away with all
scepticism. Then he remarks 'The "scandal of philosophy" is not that
this proof is yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again'.) Removal of the pseudo-problem of the 'external' world removes materialism, but does not remove matter (for which see NĀMA & RŪPA).