You said something in your last letter about the laughter that you find behind the harsher tones in what I write to you. This is not unconnected with what I was saying earlier about the difference between positive and negative thinkers. At the risk of being tiresome I shall quote Kierkegaard on this subject at some length. (Fortunately, you are not in the least obliged to read it, so it is really no imposition.)
Negative thinkers therefore always have one advantage, in that they have something positive, being aware of the negative element in existence; the positive have nothing at all, since they are deceived. Precisely because the negative is present in existence, and present everywhere (for existence is a constant process of becoming), it is necessary to become aware of its presence continuously, as the only safeguard against it. In relying upon a positive security the subject is merely deceived. (CUP, p. 75)
But the genuine subjective existing thinker is always as negative as he is positive, and vice versa. (CUP, p. 78)
That the subjective existing thinker...is immature. (CUP, p. 81)
What lies at the root of both the comic and the tragic...is the discrepancy, the contradiction between the infinite and the finite, the eternal and that which becomes. A pathos which excludes the comic is therefore a misunderstanding, is not pathos at all. The subjective existing thinker is as bi-frontal as existence itself. When viewed from a direction looking toward the eternal the apprehension of the discrepancy is pathos; when viewed with the eternal behind one the apprehension is comic. When the subjective existing thinker turns his face toward the eternal, his apprehension of the discrepancy is pathetic; when he turns his back to the eternal and lets this throw a light from behind over the same discrepancy, the apprehension is in terms of the comic. If I have not exhausted the comic to its entire depth, I do not have the pathos of the infinite; if I have the pathos of the infinite I have at once also the comic. (CUP, pp. 82-3)
Existence itself...involves a self-contradiction. (CUP, p. 84)
And where does the Buddha's Teaching come in? If we understand the 'eternal' (which for Kierkegaard is ultimately God—i.e. the soul that is part of God) as the 'subject' or 'self', and 'that which becomes' as the quite evidently impermanent 'objects' in the world (which is also K.'s meaning), the position becomes clear. What we call the 'self' is a certain characteristic of all experience, that seems to be eternal. It is quite obvious that for all men the reality and permanence of their selves, 'I', is taken absolutely for granted; and the discrepancy that K. speaks of is simply that between my 'self' (which I automatically presume to be permanent) and the only too manifestly impermanent 'things' in the world that 'I' strive to possess. The eternal 'subject' strives to possess the temporal 'object', and the situation is at once both comic and tragic—comic, because something temporal cannot be possessed eternally, and tragic, because the eternal cannot desist from making the futile attempt to possess the temporal eternally. This tragi-comedy is suffering (dukkha) in its profoundest sense. And it is release from this that the Buddha teaches. How? By pointing out that, contrary to our natural assumption (which supposes that the subject 'I' would still continue to exist even if there were no objects at all), the existence of the subject depends upon the existence of the object; and since the object is manifestly impermanent, the subject must be no less so. And once the presumed-eternal subject is seen to be no less temporal than the object, the discrepancy between the eternal and the temporal disappears (in four stages—sotāpatti, sakadāgāmitā, anāgāmitā, and arahatta); and with the disappearance of the discrepancy the two categories of 'tragic' and 'comic' also disappear. The arahat neither laughs nor weeps; and that is the end of suffering (except, of course, for bodily pain, which only ceases when the body finally breaks up).
In this way you may see the progressive advance from the thoughtlessness of immediacy (either childish amusement, which refuses to take the tragic seriously, or pompous earnestness, which refuses to take the comic humourously) to the awareness of reflexion (where the tragic and the comic are seen to be reciprocal, and each is given its due), and from the awareness of reflexion (which is the limit of the puthujjana's philosophy) to full realization of the ariya dhamma (where both tragic and comic finally vanish, never again to return). Nanavira Thera (letter)


Cessation of being

Why do normal people normally react with panic and horror to the idea of cessation of being, or cessation of consciousness? There are at least two reasons. There is first the failure to see both sides of life, the negative/destructive as well as the positive/constructive, which are (as it were) the obverse and reverse of each piece of experience. It is a refusal to face the ambivalence of experience, and a putting on of blinkers to shut out, as far as one can, what is disturbing. It is by this that life is made to look nice, and appears tolerable. The process is largely automatic and subconscious, so it is seldom ever enquired into. With the blinkers on one does not see what is unwelcome and one quickly forgets the unwelcome that intrudes.

And here I want to distinguish two kinds of suffering: (1) enjoyable suffering and pain (the arduousness of exhausting sports, self mortification, “being ill,” masochism and sadism, etc.), which are not properly suffering because they are enjoyed and welcomed; and (2) horror or nausea, which is all those things (whatever they may be, and they vary with different people) that produce horror, nausea, and vertigo, because they are absurd and menace the core and pattern of our personal existence. Everyone knows that border across which he cannot go, even in thought, and it is that, not the former, that people automatically shut out and cannot face. Yet one knows at times (in the middle of the night, perhaps, when one is sleepless, or on encountering some revolting experience) that this horror haunts every form of experience (always and ever), and hastily one readjusts the blinkers that had slipped. Put the beautiful before you and the horror behind you. Yes, but then I shall not dare to turn round.

The world is a bad place. Is it? But it seems that this haunting, this self-delusion by wearing blinkers, is not an attribute of the world. The haunting is in consciousness itself, in its very nature. Just as when I set up any object in the sunlight a shadow is cast (because it is the nature of sunlight to cast shadows), so anything that comes into the light of consciousness casts a shadow of the unknown. It is in the unknown that the horror resides in the dark of knowledge where the patterns can no longer be traced, where chaos resides, and whence utterly hostile systems may emerge, devour, and digest us.

Again this insecurity resides in consciousness because it cheats. It lives between the past and the future like a reflection between two opposing mirrors. I put my head between the opposing mirrors and I see the reflection of the reflection of the reflection … which suggests recession to infinity. But I cannot see that infinity because (even if the glasses were clear enough) my head and its reflections are in the way. But then if I slightly displace one mirror so that my head is no more in the way then the series of reflections passes out of the field of the mirrors at some stage of the reflections which it must now do (unless the mirrors are made of infinite size). So I am forced by this set of experiences to infer an infinity of which the very circumstances deny the possibility of my experiencing. That is one essential aspect of consciousness: it cheats.

Another example is the moon. I see as an experience an existent crescent, an existent half-moon, or full moon, and there are perceptions of existents that are repeated (which are in fact over and done with as soon as experienced). Consciousness groups together these repeated experiences and forms a concept that transcends all these possible existents, and which it presents as “the moon.” But “the moon” can never be experienced, and even when visualized it is only as one of its aspects. It is a fake. This concept “the moon” is then projected upon the objective world where it appears to lurk behind existence as Kant’s “Ding an sich,” or, say, Eddington’s “reality,” that the physicists are trying to discover behind what they investigate. Suppose a man gets lost in a desert and he wanders all night. When the sun comes up he may see lots of tracks in the sand all pointing the way he is going. He thinks, “Marvellous! I am on the high road. Lots of people have gone this way already. I am alright.” So he follows them. They are, in fact, his own tracks made in the night by his walking in circles (which people actually do). If he does not stop to consider and goes on following them, he will get nowhere. He will die. If he put aside his assumption and looked about him, it is possible he might find the way of escape.

This is what I mean by the failure to see both sides of life, to see things and ourselves as they and we really are, in their relationship. This is what Mara (if we like personification) tries his utmost to keep us from seeing, for it is by this that we can slip out of his clutches. Mara is Death, but he is also Life, for “all that is subject to arising is subject to cessation,” “all that is born and lives dies.” Byron said somewhere:

Sorrow is knowledge: they who know the most
Must mourn the deepest o’er the fatal Truth.
The Tree of Knowledge is not that of life.

But it is Mara that makes us mourn because he makes his living by that, just as a rubber estate owner makes his living by the trees that he cultivates and bleeds, and cuts down when they are old.

But there is another, equally fundamental, reason that makes people shy away from the notion—their notion—of cessation. This is a very deep-rooted double misconception: (1) there is the idea that by “cessation,” by “extinction,” something “good” and “valuable” and “lasting” will be “lost forever,” and (2) there is an uncritical assumption that consciousness will somehow continue to survive—will be “there”—to be aware of this as an “everlasting privation.” “Does all this” they say “only end in extinction? But a state of nothingness is horrible!” and there the whole double misconception lies like a pair of Siamese Twins in a bed. But there is, in the last analysis, no “entirely good” and “lasting” individual thing or state discoverable anywhere. Whatever appears good melts away in the end. The subconscious cheating of the mind seizes on the good, rejects and forgets it, and it melts away. By a “sleight of mind” that is one of consciousness’s essential functions, the idea is presented that it is possible to skim the good off the world, like cream on a bowl of milk, and live in that cream in “eternal bliss.” But, alas, like the cream, the bowl of heavenly bliss is not permanent. Such is the “good” that is supposed to be “lost.” And then there is the instinctive feeling, the uncritical automatic reaction that takes cessation somehow to mean a survival of conscious awareness of that loss, in spite of the fact that the proposition was in the first place “cessation of consciousness.” This is the verbal-mental subconscious cheating that has only to be examined fearlessly to see it as a mere self-contradiction. If consciousness ceases and with it its objects, there is no question of conscious awareness of privation. If there is awareness of loss and privation, consciousness has not ceased, and it is not such cessation that is being talked about. This misconception (often enough believed in due to uncritical acceptance) is often used to deride Buddhists without seeing that it hurts only him who uses it. And not only Buddhists, for Sankara in his commentary to the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad says: “The Buddhists themselves do not deny the existence of gods and heavens [or hells]—they are not atheists—but only that the gods are omnipotent or ever-lasting: they change and die, let one down, make one let oneself down, because they cannot help it, because consciousness and its objects, with its disease of impermanence, are there too.”

Consciousness without object is impossible, not conceivable, and objects without consciousness, when talked about, are only a verbal abstraction. One cannot talk or think about objects that have no relation to consciousness. The two are inseparable and it is only a verbal abstraction to talk about them separately (legitimate of course in a limited sphere).

But it is in the consideration of this cessation as the goal that the real comfort and safety are to be found. There is no cheating here, and no anxiety to exclude haunting opposites. All else, however good it seems, is only temporary, because there is consciousness there to know and to change. So there is no permanent safety of attack or harm, and there is no permanent safety from one’s being led to do harm, even if that harm is merely changing. Nanamoli Thera

Beginningless, monks, is this running on of existence; a starting point of creatures who are coursing and running on constrained by nescience and attached by craving is not manifest.

How do you conceive this, monks: which is more, the blood that has flowed and streamed from your severed heads in this long stretch of coursing and running on, or the water in the four great oceans?

– According, Lord, to our comprehension of the Teaching (dhamma) set forth by the Auspicious One, the blood that has flowed and streamed from our severed heads in this long coursing and running on is indeed more than the water in the four great oceans.

– Well said, well said, monks: well have you thus comprehended the Teaching set forth by me. The blood that has flowed and streamed from your severed heads in this long coursing and running on is indeed more than the water in the four great oceans. A long time, monks, has the blood flowed and streamed from your severed heads when you were oxen: more than the water in the four great oceans. ...when you were buffaloes ... sheep ... goats ... deer ... chickens ... pigs ... when you were taken as village robbers ... when you were taken as highway robbers ... when you were taken as adulterers.... Why is this? Beginningless, monks, is this running on of existence: a starting point of creatures who are coursing and running on constrained by nescience and attached by craving is not manifest. For so long, monks, have you enjoyed (éprouvé) suffering (dukkha), agony, and misfortune, and swelled the charnel grounds: long enough, monks, for disgust for all determinations, for the fading out of lust for them, for release from them.  Anamatagga Samy. 13 (ii,187-9)