"The untaught ordinary man who has
no regard for noble ones
... gives unreasoned (uncritical) attention
in this way: 'Was I in the
past? Was I not in the past? What was I
in the past? How was I
in the past? Having been what, what was I in
the past? Shall I be
in the future? Shall I not be in the future?
What shall I be in the
future? How shall I be in the future? Having
been what, what shall
I be in the future?' Or else he wonders about
himself now in the presently arisen period in this way: 'Am I? Am I
not? What am I? How
am I? Whence has this being come? Whither is it
bound?'
"When he gives unreasoned
attention in this way, then one of
six types of view arises in him
as true and established: 'My self
exists' or 'My self does not
exist' or 'I perceive self with self or 'I
perceive not-self with
self or 'I perceive self with not-self or some
such view as 'This is
my self that speaks and feels and experiences
here or there the
ripening of good and bad actions; but this my self
is permanent,
everlasting, not subject to change, and will endure as
long as
eternity.' This field of views is called the thicket of views,
the
wilderness of views, the contortion of views, the vacillation of
views, the fetter of views. The untaught ordinary man bound by
the
fetter of views is not freed from birth, ageing and death, sorrow
and lamentation, pain, grief and despair: he is not freed from
suffering, I say."
M. 2
"Bhikkhus, the possession that one
might possess that were permanent, everlasting ... do you see any
such possession?"—"No,
Lord."—"... The
self-theory clinging whereby one might cling
that would never arouse
sorrow and ... despair in him who clung
thereby; do you see any such
self-theory clinging?"—"No, Lord."—"...
The
view as support that one might take as support that would never
arouse sorrow and ... despair in him who took it as support; do you
see any such view as support?"—"No, Lord."—"...Bhikkhus,
there
being self, would there be selfs property?"—"Yes,
Lord."—"And
there being selfs property, would there be
self?"—"Yes, Lord."—
"Bhikkhus, self and
selfs property being unapprehendable as true and
established, then
would not this view—'This is the world, this the
self; after death
I shall be permanent, everlasting, eternal, not subject
to change, I
shall endure as long as eternity'—be the pure perfection
of a
fool's idea?"—"How could it not be, Lord? It would be the
pure
perfection of a fool's idea."
M. 22
Footnotes:
[d] 'I urge
the following dilemma. If your Ego has no content, it is nothing, and
it therefore is not experienced; but if on the other hand it is
anything, it is a phenomenon in time.'—F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, Oxford (1893) 1962, Ch. XXIII.
[d] Manifest
impermanence and unpleasurableness at a coarse level does not exclude
(false) perception of permanence and pleasure at a fine level (indeed,
manifest unpleasurableness requires false perception of permanence, as remarked above [this refers, of course, only to sankhāradukkha]).
But the coarse notion of 'self' must be removed before the subtle
conceit '(I) am' can go. What is not regarded as 'self' is more
manifestly impermanent and unpleasurable (and, of course, not-'self')
than what is so regarded. Therefore the indirect approach to dhammā by way of sankhārā. Avijjā cannot be pulled out like a nail: it must be unscrewed. See MAMA & SANKHĀRA.
On another occasion the wanderer
Vacchagotta went to the
Blessed One and exchanged greetings with
him. Then he asked:
"How is it, Master Gotama, does self
exist?" When this was said, the
Blessed One was silent. "
How is it, then, Master Gotama, does self
not exist?" And for a
second time the Blessed One was silent. Then
the wanderer
Vacchagotta got up from his seat and went away. Not
long after he
had gone the venerable Ananda asked the Blessed One :
"Lord,
how is it that when the Blessed O n e was questioned he did nor
answer?"
"If, when I was asked 'Does self
exist?' I had answered 'Self
exists,' that would have been the
belief of those who hold the
theory of eternalism. And if, when I
was asked 'Does self not exist?'
I had answered 'Self does not
exist,' that would have been the belief of
those who hold the theory
of annihilationism. Again, if, when asked
'Does self exist?' I had
answered 'Self exists,' would that have been
in conformity with my
knowledge that all things are not-self? And if,
when asked 'Does
self not exist?' I had answered 'Self does not exist,'
then confused
as he already is, Ananda, the wanderer Vacchagotta
would have become
still more confused, assuming: 'Surely then I had
a self before and
now have none.' "
S. 44:10
"There are these three types of acquisition of self: the gross, the mind-constituted, and the formless.... The first has (material) form, consists of the four great entities and consumes physical food. The second has form and is constituted by mind with all the limbs and lacking no faculty. The third is formless and consists in perception .... I teach the Dhamma for the abandoning of acquisitions of self in order that in you, who put the teaching into practice, defiling qualities may be abandoned and cleansing qualities increased, and that you may, by realisation yourselves here and now with direct knowledge, enter upon and abide in the fullness of understanding's perfection.... If it is thought that to do that is a painful abiding, that is not so; on the contrary, by doing that there is gladness, happiness, tranquillity, mindfulness, full awareness, and a pleasant abiding."
The Buddha went on to say that from one rebirth to another any one of these three kinds of acquisition of self can succeed another. That being so, it cannot be successfully argued that only one of them is true and the others wrong; one can only say that the term for any one does not fit the other two; just as, with milk from a cow, curd from milk, butter from curd, ghee from butter, and fine-extract of ghee from ghee, the term of each fits only that and none of the others, yet they are not disconnected. The Buddha concluded:
"These are worldly usages, worldly language, worldly terms of communication, worldly descriptions, by which a Perfect One communicates without misapprehending them." D. 9 (condensed)
"There are these three types of acquisition of self: the gross, the mind-constituted, and the formless.... The first has (material) form, consists of the four great entities and consumes physical food. The second has form and is constituted by mind with all the limbs and lacking no faculty. The third is formless and consists in perception .... I teach the Dhamma for the abandoning of acquisitions of self in order that in you, who put the teaching into practice, defiling qualities may be abandoned and cleansing qualities increased, and that you may, by realisation yourselves here and now with direct knowledge, enter upon and abide in the fullness of understanding's perfection.... If it is thought that to do that is a painful abiding, that is not so; on the contrary, by doing that there is gladness, happiness, tranquillity, mindfulness, full awareness, and a pleasant abiding."
The Buddha went on to say that from one rebirth to another any one of these three kinds of acquisition of self can succeed another. That being so, it cannot be successfully argued that only one of them is true and the others wrong; one can only say that the term for any one does not fit the other two; just as, with milk from a cow, curd from milk, butter from curd, ghee from butter, and fine-extract of ghee from ghee, the term of each fits only that and none of the others, yet they are not disconnected. The Buddha concluded:
"These are worldly usages, worldly language, worldly terms of communication, worldly descriptions, by which a Perfect One communicates without misapprehending them." D. 9 (condensed)
ATTĀ
In the arahat's reflexion what appears reflexively is only pañcakkhandhā, which he calls 'myself' simply for want of any other term. But in the puthujjana's reflexion what appears reflexively is pañc'upādānakkhandhā, or sakkāya; and sakkāya (q.v.),
when it appears reflexively, appears (in one way or another) as being
and belonging to an extra-temporal changeless 'self' (i.e. a soul). The puthujjana confuses (as the arahat does not) the self-identity of simple reflexion—as with a mirror, where the same thing is seen from two points of view at once ('the thing itself', 'the selfsame thing')—with the 'self' as the subject that appears in reflexion—'my self' (i.e. 'I itself', i.e. 'the I that appears when I reflect'). For the puthujjana the word self
is necessarily ambiguous, since he cannot conceive of any reflexion not
involving reflexive experience of the subject—i.e. not involving
manifestation of a soul. Since the self of self-identity is
involved in the structure of the subject appearing in reflexion ('my
self' = 'I itself'), it is sometimes taken (when recourse is not had to a
supposed Transcendental Being) as the basic principle of all
subjectivity. The subject is then conceived as a hypostasized play of
reflexions of one kind or another, the hypostasis itself somehow
deriving from (or being motivated by) the play of reflexions. The puthujjana, however, does not see that attainment of arahattā
removes all trace of the desire or conceit '(I) am', leaving the entire
reflexive structure intact—in other words, that subjectivity is a
parasite on experience. Indeed, it is by his very failure to see this
that he remains a puthujjana.
The question of self-identity arises either when a thing is seen from two points of view at once (as in reflexion,[a]
for example; or when it is at the same time the object of two different
senses—I am now both looking at my pen and touching it with my fingers,
and I might wonder if it is the same pen in the two simultaneous experiences [see RŪPA]), or when a thing is seen to endure in time, when the question may be asked if it continues to be the same thing (the answer being, that a thing at any one given level of generality is the invariant of a transformation—see ANICCA [a] & FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE—, and that 'to remain the same' means just this).[b] With the question of a thing's self-identity (which presents no particular difficulty) the Buddha's Teaching of anattā has nothing whatsoever to do: anattā is purely concerned with 'self' as subject. (See PATICCASAMUPPĀDA [c].)
'Self' as subject can be briefly discussed as follows. As pointed out in PHASSA [b], the puthujjana thinks 'things are mine
(i.e. are my concern) because I am, because I exist'. He takes the
subject ('I') for granted; and if things are appropriated, that is
because he, the subject, exists. The ditthisampanna (or sotāpanna) sees, however, that this is the wrong way round. He sees that the notion 'I am' arises because things (so long as there is any trace of avijjā) present themselves as 'mine'. This significance (or intention, or determination), 'mine' or 'for me'—see A NOTE ON PATICCASAMUPPĀDA [e]—, is, in a sense, a void, a negative aspect of the present thing (or existing phenomenon), since it simply points to a subject; and the puthujjana,
not seeing impermanence (or more specifically, not seeing the
impermanence of this ubiquitous determination), deceives himself into
supposing that there actually exists a subject—'self'—independent of the
object (which latter, as the ditthisampanna well understands, is merely the positive aspect of the phenomenon—that which is 'for me'). In this way it may be seen that the puthujjana's experience, pañc'upādānakkhandhā, has a negative aspect (the subject) and a positive
aspect (the object). But care is needed; for, in fact, the division
subject/object is not a simple negative/positive division. If it were,
only the positive would be present (as an existing phenomenon) and the
negative (the subject) would not be present at all—it would simply not exist. But the subject is, in a sense, phenomenal: it (or he) is an existing phenomenal negative, a negative that appears; for the puthujjana
asserts the present reality of his 'self' ('the irreplaceable being
that I am'). The fact is, that the intention or determination 'mine',
pointing to a subject, is a complex structure involving avijjā. The subject is not simply a negative in relation to the positive object: it (or he) is master
over the object, and is thus a kind of positive negative, a master who
does not appear explicitly but who, somehow or other, nevertheless exists.[c] It is this master whom the puthujjana, when he engages in reflexion, is seeking to identify—in vain![d] This delusive mastery of subject over object must be rigorously distinguished from the reflexive power of control or choice that is exercised in voluntary action by puthujjana and arahat alike. Nanavira Thera
For a discussion of sabbe dhammā anattā see DHAMMA.
Footnotes:
[a] In
immediate experience the thing is present; in reflexive experience the
thing is again present, but as implicit in a more general thing. Thus in
reflexion the thing is twice present, once immediately and
once reflexively. This is true of reflexion both in the loose sense (as
reflection or discursive thinking) and a fortiori in the stricter sense (for the reason that reflection involves reflexion, though not vice versa). See MANO and also VIÑÑĀNA [d].
[b] 'It
takes two to make the same, and the least we can have is some change of
event in a self-same thing, or the return to that thing from some
suggested difference.'—F. H. Bradley, The Principles of Logic, Oxford (1883) 1958, I,v,§1.
[c] With the exception of consciousness (which cannot be directly qualified—see VIÑÑĀNA [c] — every determination has a positive as well as a negative aspect: it is positive in so far as it is in itself something, and negative in so far as it is not
what it determines. This is evident enough in the case of a thing's
potentialities, which are given as images (or absents) together with the
real (or present) thing. But the positive negativity of the subject,
which is what concerns us here, is by no means such a simple affair: the
subject presents itself (or himself), at the same time, as certainly
more elusive, and yet as no less real, than the object.
Images are present as absent (or negative) reality, but as images
(or images of images) they are present, or real. Also, being plural,
they are more elusive, individually, than reality, which is singular
(see NĀMA).
The imaginary, therefore, in any given part of it, combines reality
with elusiveness; and it is thus easily supposed that what is imaginary
is subjective and what is real is objective. But imagination survives
the disappearance of subjectivity (asmimāna, asmī ti chanda): Samvijjati kho āvuso Bhagavato mano, vijānāti Bhagavā manasā dhammam, chandarāgo Bhagavato n'atthi, suvimuttacitto Bhagavā. ('The Auspicious One, friend, possesses a mind (mano);
the Auspicious One cognizes images (ideas) with the mind;
desire-&-lust for the Auspicious One there is not; the Auspicious
One is wholly freed in heart (citta). (Cf. Salāyatana Samy. xviii,5, quoted at PHASSA [d].)')
Salāyatana Samy. xviii,5 <S.iv.164> The elusiveness of images is
not at all the same as the elusiveness of the subject. (It is in this
sense that science, in claiming to deal only with reality, calls itself
objective.)
DHAMMA
The word dhamma, in its most general sense, is equivalent to 'thing'—i.e. whatever is distinct from anything else (see ANICCA). More precisely it is what a thing is in itself, as opposed to how it is;[a] it is the essence or nature of a thing—that is, a thing as a particular essence or nature distinct from all other essences or natures. Thus, if a thing is a solid pleasant shady tree for lying under that I now see, its nature is, precisely, that it is solid, that it is pleasant, that it is shady, that it is a tree for lying under, and that it is visible to me. The solid pleasant shady tree for lying under that I see is a thing, a nature, a dhamma. Furthermore, each item severally—the solidity, the pleasantness, the shadiness, and so on—is a thing, a nature, a dhamma, in that each is distinct from the others, even though here they may not be independent of one another. These dhammā, in the immediate experience, are all particular. When, however, the reflexive[b] attitude is adopted (as it is in satisampajañña,
the normal state of one practising the Dhamma), the particular
nature—the solid pleasant shady tree for lying under that I see—is, as
it were, 'put in brackets' (Husserl's expression, though not quite his
meaning of it), and we arrive at the nature of the particular nature. Instead of solid, pleasant, shady, tree for lying under, visible to me, and so on, we have matter (or substance), feeling, perception, determinations, consciousness, and all the various 'things' that the Suttas speak of. These things are of universal application—i.e. common to all particular natures (e.g. eye- consciousness is common to all things that have ever been, or are, or will be, visible to me)—and are the dhammā
that make up the Dhamma. The Dhamma is thus the Nature of Things. And
since this is what the Buddha teaches, it comes to mean also the
Teaching, and dhammā are particular teachings. The word matter—'I will bear this matter in mind'—sometimes expresses the meaning of dhamma (though it will not do as a normal rendering).
Sabbe sankhārā aniccā; Sabbe sankhārā dukkhā; Sabbe dhammā anattā. ('All determinations are impermanent; All determinations are unpleasurable (suffering); All things are not-self.') Attā, 'self', is fundamentally a notion of mastery over things (cf. Majjhima iv,5 <M.i,231-2> & Khandha Samy. vi,7 <S.iii,66>[7]). But this notion is entertained only if it is pleasurable,[c]
and it is only pleasurable provided the mastery is assumed to be
permanent; for a mastery—which is essentially a kind of absolute
timelessness, an unmoved moving of things—that is undermined by impermanence is no mastery at all, but a mockery. Thus the regarding of a thing, a dhamma, as attā or 'self' can survive for only so long as the notion gives pleasure, and it only gives pleasure for so long as that dhamma
can be considered as permanent (for the regarding of a thing as 'self'
endows it with the illusion of a kind of super-stability in time). In
itself, as a dhamma regarded as attā, its impermanence
is not manifest (for it is pleasant to consider it as permanent); but
when it is seen to be dependent upon other dhammā not considered to be permanent, its impermanence does then become manifest. To see impermanence in what is regarded as attā, one must emerge from the confines of the individual dhamma itself and see that it depends on what is impermanent. Thus sabbe sankhārā (not dhammā) aniccā is said, meaning 'All things that things (dhammā) depend on are impermanent'. A given dhamma, as a dhamma regarded as attā, is, on account of being so regarded, considered to be pleasant; but when it is seen to be dependent upon some other dhamma that, not being regarded as attā, is manifestly unpleasurable (owing to the invariable false perception of permanence, of super-stability, in one not free from asmimāna), then its own unpleasurableness becomes manifest. Thus sabbe sankhārā (not dhammā) dukkhā is said. When this is seen—i.e. when perception of permanence and pleasure is understood to be false --, the notion 'This dhamma is my attā' comes to an end, and is replaced by sabbe dhammā anattā. Note that it is the sotāpanna
who, knowing and seeing that his perception of permanence and pleasure
is false, is free from this notion of 'self', though not from the more
subtle conceit '(I) am' (asmimāna);[d] but it is only the arahat
who is entirely free from the (false) perception of permanence and
pleasure, and 'for him' perception of impermanence is no longer
unpleasurable. (See also A NOTE ON PATICCASAMUPPĀDA §12 & PARAMATTHA SACCA.)
Footnotes:
[a] How a thing is, is a matter of structure, that is to say, of intentions (cetanā) or determinations (sankhārā). See CETANĀ. These are essentially negative, whereas dhamma is positive.
[b] This word is neither quite right nor quite wrong, but it is as good as any. See CETANĀ, MANO, and ATTĀ, and also FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE (where, in Part I,
the possibility of reflexion is shown to be structurally justified).
The possibility of reflexion depends upon the fact that all experience
(the five khandhā or aggregates) is hierarchically ordered in
different levels of generality (or particularity), going to infinity in
both directions. This supports another hierarchy, as it were 'at right
angles' to the original hierarchy. In immediacy, attention rests on the world. This requires no effort. In reflexion,
attention moves back one step from the world in this second hierarchy.
It does not, however, move back spontaneously: it requires to be pulled
back by an intention that embraces both the ground level and the first
step. This pulling back of attention is reflexive intention. A deliberate entering upon reflexion requires a further reflexive intention; for deliberate intention is intention to intend (or volition). Double
attention is involved. But though, in immediacy, attention rests at
ground level, the entire reflexive hierarchy remains 'potential' (it is there, but not attended to), and immediacy is always under potential reflexive observation (i.e. it is seen but not noticed). Another way of saying this is that the 'potential' reflexive hierarchy—which we might call pre-reflexive—is a hierarchy of consciousness (viññāna), not of awareness (sampajañña). For awareness, reflexive intention is necessary.
[c] This notion is pleasurable only if it is itself taken as permanent (it is my notion); thus it does not escape sankhāradukkha. But unless this notion is brought to an end there is no escape from sankhāradukkha.
The linchpin is carried by the wheel as it turns; but so long as it
carries the linchpin the wheel will turn. (That 'self' is spoken of here
as a notion should not mislead the reader into supposing that a
purely abstract idea, based upon faulty reasoning, is what is referred
to. The puthujjana does not by any means experience his 'self' as an abstraction, and this because it is not rationally that notions of subjectivity are bound up with nescience (avijjā), but affectively. Reason comes in (when it comes in at all) only in the second place, to make what it can of a fait accompli. Avijjāsamphassajena
bhikhave vedayitena phutthassa assutavato puthujjanassa, Asmī ti pi'ssa
hoti, Ayam aham asmī ti pi'ssa hoti, Bhavissan ti pi'ssa hoti,... ('To
the uninstructed commoner, monks, contacted by feeling born of
nescience-contact, it occurs '(I) am', it occurs 'It is this that I am',
it occurs 'I shall be',...') Khandha Samy. v,5 <S.iii,46>. And in
Dīgha ii,2 <D.ii,66-8> it is in relation to feeling that the
possible ways of regarding 'self' are discussed: Vedanā me attā ti;
Na h'eva kho me vedanā attā, appatisamvedano me attā ti; Na h'eva kho me
vedanā attā, no pi appatisamvedano me attā, attā me vediyati
vedanādhammo hi me attā ti. ('My self is feeling; My self is not in
fact feeling, my self is devoid of feeling; My self is not in fact
feeling, but neither is my self devoid of feeling, my self feels, to
feel is the nature of my self.')
