At Savatthı̄. Then the Venerable Upavaṇa approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and said to him:
“Venerable sir, some ascetics and brahmins maintain that suffering is created by oneself; some ascetics and brahmins maintain that suffering is created by another; some ascetics and brahmins maintain that suffering is created both by oneself and by another; some ascetics and brahmins maintain that suffering has arisen fortuitously, being created neither by oneself nor by another. Now, venerable sir, what does the Blessed One say about this? What does he teach? How should we answer if we are to state what has been said by the Blessed One and not misrepresent him with what is contrary to fact? And how should we explain in accordance with the Dhamma so that no reasonable consequence of our assertion would give ground for criticism?”
“Upavaṇa, I have said that suffering is dependently arisen. Dependent on what? Dependent on contact. If one were to speak thus one would be stating what has been said by me and would not misrepresent me with what is contrary to fact; one would explain in accordance with the Dhamma, and no reasonable consequence of one’s assertion would give ground for criticism.
“Therein, Upavaṇa, in the case of those ascetics and brahmins who maintain that suffering is created by oneself, and those who maintain that suffering is created by another, and those who maintain that suffering is created both by oneself and by another, and those who maintain that suffering has arisen fortuitously, being created neither by oneself nor by another—in each case that is conditioned by contact.
“Therein, Upavaṇa, in the case of those ascetics and brahmins who maintain that suffering is created by oneself, and those who maintain that suffering is created by another, and those who maintain that suffering is created both by oneself and by another, and those who maintain that suffering has arisen fortuitously, being created neither by oneself nor by another—in each case it is impossible that they will experience without contact.” SN 12: 26
Phassa, 'contact', is defined (Salāyatana Samy. iv,10 <S.iv,67-9>) as the coming together of the eye, forms, and eye-consciousness (and so with the ear and the rest). But it is probably wrong to suppose that we must therefore understand the word phassa, primarily at least, as contact between these three things.[a] So long as there is avijjā, all things (dhammā) are fundamentally as described in the earlier part of the Mūlapariyāyasutta (Majjhima i,1 <M.i,1>); that is to say, they are inherently in subjection, they are appropriated, they are mine (See ANICCA, MAMA, & A NOTE ON PATICCASAMUPPĀDA [f]). This is the foundation of the notion that I am and that things are in contact with me. This contact between me and things is phassa. The ditthisampanna sees the deception, but the puthujjana accepts it at its face value and elaborates it into a relationship between himself and the world (attā ca loko ca—which relationship is then capable of further elaboration into a variety of views [Majjhima xi,2 <M.ii,233>]).[b] But though the ditthisampanna is not deceived, yet until he becomes arahat the aroma of subjectivity (asmī ti, '[I] am') hangs about all his experience. All normal experience is dual (dvayam—see NĀMA, final paragraph): there are present (i) one's conscious six-based body (saviññānaka salāyatanika kāya), and (ii) other phenomena (namely, whatever is not one's body); and reflexion will show that, though both are objective in the experience, the aroma of subjectivity that attaches to the experience will naturally tend to be attributed to the body.[c] In this way, phassa comes to be seen as contact between the conscious eye and forms—but mark that this is because contact is primarily between subject and object, and not between eye, forms, and eye-consciousness. This approach makes it possible to see in what sense, with the entire cessation of all illusion of 'I' and 'mine', there is phassanirodha in the arahat (where, though there are still, so long as he continues to live, both the conscious body and the other phenomena, there is no longer any appropriation). But when (as commonly) phassa is interpreted as 'contact between sense-organ and sense-object, resulting in consciousness'—and its translation as '(sense-)impression' implies this interpretation—then we are at once cut off from all possibility of understanding phassanirodha in the arahat;[d] for the question whether or not the eye is the subject is not even raised—we are concerned only with the eye as a sense-organ, and it is a sense-organ in puthujjana and arahat alike. Understanding of phassa now consists in accounting for consciousness starting from physiological (or neurological) descriptions of the sense-organs and their functioning. Consciousness, however, is not physiologically observable, and the entire project rests upon unjustifiable assumptions from the start.[e] This epistemological interpretation of phassa misconceives the Dhamma as a kind of natural-science-cum-psychology that provides an explanation of things in terms of cause-and- effect. Nanavira Thera
“Venerable sir, some ascetics and brahmins maintain that suffering is created by oneself; some ascetics and brahmins maintain that suffering is created by another; some ascetics and brahmins maintain that suffering is created both by oneself and by another; some ascetics and brahmins maintain that suffering has arisen fortuitously, being created neither by oneself nor by another. Now, venerable sir, what does the Blessed One say about this? What does he teach? How should we answer if we are to state what has been said by the Blessed One and not misrepresent him with what is contrary to fact? And how should we explain in accordance with the Dhamma so that no reasonable consequence of our assertion would give ground for criticism?”
“Upavaṇa, I have said that suffering is dependently arisen. Dependent on what? Dependent on contact. If one were to speak thus one would be stating what has been said by me and would not misrepresent me with what is contrary to fact; one would explain in accordance with the Dhamma, and no reasonable consequence of one’s assertion would give ground for criticism.
“Therein, Upavaṇa, in the case of those ascetics and brahmins who maintain that suffering is created by oneself, and those who maintain that suffering is created by another, and those who maintain that suffering is created both by oneself and by another, and those who maintain that suffering has arisen fortuitously, being created neither by oneself nor by another—in each case that is conditioned by contact.
“Therein, Upavaṇa, in the case of those ascetics and brahmins who maintain that suffering is created by oneself, and those who maintain that suffering is created by another, and those who maintain that suffering is created both by oneself and by another, and those who maintain that suffering has arisen fortuitously, being created neither by oneself nor by another—in each case it is impossible that they will experience without contact.” SN 12: 26
Phassa, 'contact', is defined (Salāyatana Samy. iv,10 <S.iv,67-9>) as the coming together of the eye, forms, and eye-consciousness (and so with the ear and the rest). But it is probably wrong to suppose that we must therefore understand the word phassa, primarily at least, as contact between these three things.[a] So long as there is avijjā, all things (dhammā) are fundamentally as described in the earlier part of the Mūlapariyāyasutta (Majjhima i,1 <M.i,1>); that is to say, they are inherently in subjection, they are appropriated, they are mine (See ANICCA, MAMA, & A NOTE ON PATICCASAMUPPĀDA [f]). This is the foundation of the notion that I am and that things are in contact with me. This contact between me and things is phassa. The ditthisampanna sees the deception, but the puthujjana accepts it at its face value and elaborates it into a relationship between himself and the world (attā ca loko ca—which relationship is then capable of further elaboration into a variety of views [Majjhima xi,2 <M.ii,233>]).[b] But though the ditthisampanna is not deceived, yet until he becomes arahat the aroma of subjectivity (asmī ti, '[I] am') hangs about all his experience. All normal experience is dual (dvayam—see NĀMA, final paragraph): there are present (i) one's conscious six-based body (saviññānaka salāyatanika kāya), and (ii) other phenomena (namely, whatever is not one's body); and reflexion will show that, though both are objective in the experience, the aroma of subjectivity that attaches to the experience will naturally tend to be attributed to the body.[c] In this way, phassa comes to be seen as contact between the conscious eye and forms—but mark that this is because contact is primarily between subject and object, and not between eye, forms, and eye-consciousness. This approach makes it possible to see in what sense, with the entire cessation of all illusion of 'I' and 'mine', there is phassanirodha in the arahat (where, though there are still, so long as he continues to live, both the conscious body and the other phenomena, there is no longer any appropriation). But when (as commonly) phassa is interpreted as 'contact between sense-organ and sense-object, resulting in consciousness'—and its translation as '(sense-)impression' implies this interpretation—then we are at once cut off from all possibility of understanding phassanirodha in the arahat;[d] for the question whether or not the eye is the subject is not even raised—we are concerned only with the eye as a sense-organ, and it is a sense-organ in puthujjana and arahat alike. Understanding of phassa now consists in accounting for consciousness starting from physiological (or neurological) descriptions of the sense-organs and their functioning. Consciousness, however, is not physiologically observable, and the entire project rests upon unjustifiable assumptions from the start.[e] This epistemological interpretation of phassa misconceives the Dhamma as a kind of natural-science-cum-psychology that provides an explanation of things in terms of cause-and- effect. Nanavira Thera
Footnotes:
[a] This interpretation of phassa is not invited by the Mahānidānasuttanta (Dīgha ii,2 <D.ii,62>[9]), where nāmarūpapaccayā phasso is discussed without reference to salāyatana, and in terms of adhivacanasamphassa and patighasamphassa. These terms are more easily comprehensible when phassa is understood as 'contact between subject and object'. (It is an elementary mistake to equate patighasamphassa ['resistance-contact'] with five-base-contact [cakkhusamphassa &c.] and adhivacanasamphassa ['designation-contact'] with mind-contact [manosamphassa]. Adhivacana and patigha correspond to nāma and rūpa respectively, and it is clear from Majjhima iii,8 <M.i,190-1>[10] that both nāma and rūpa are conditions for each of the six kinds of contact. See NĀMA.)
[b] The puthujjana takes for granted that 'I am' is the fundamental fact, and supposes that 'things are mine (or concern me) because I am'. The ditthisampanna sees that this is the wrong way round. He sees that there is the conceit (concept) '(I) am' because
'things are mine'. With perception of impermanence, the inherent
appropriation subsides; 'things are mine' gives place to just 'things
are' (which things are still significant—they point to or
indicate other things—, but no longer point to a 'subject'); and 'I am'
vanishes. With the coming to an end of the arahat's life there is the ending of 'things are'. While the arahat
still lives, then, there continue to be 'objects' in the sense of
'things'; but if 'objects' are understood as necessarily correlative to a
'subject', then 'things' can no longer be called 'objects'. See ATTĀ. Similarly with the 'world' as the correlative of 'self': so long as the arahat
lives, there is still an organized perspective of significant things;
but they are no longer significant 'to him', nor do they 'signify him'.
See Preface (f).
[c] If
experience were confined to the use of a single eye, the eye and forms
would not be distinguishable, they would not appear as separate things;
there would be just the experience describable in terms of pañc'upādānakkhandhā.
But normal experience is always multiple, and other faculties (touch
and so on) are engaged at the same time, and the eye and forms as
separate things are manifest to them (in the duality of experience
already referred to). The original experience is thus found to be a relationship:
but the fleshly eye is observed (by the other faculties, notably touch,
and by the eyes themselves seeing their own reflexion) to be invariable
(it is always 'here', idha), whereas forms are observed to be variable (they are plural and 'yonder', huram).
Visual experience, however, also is variable, and its entire content is
thus naturally attributed to forms and none of it to the eye. In visual
experience, then, forms are seen, the eye is unseen, yet (as our other faculties or a looking-glass informs us) there is the eye. Also in visual experience, but in quite a different way (indicated earlier), objects are seen, the subject is unseen (explicitly, at least; otherwise it [or he] would be an object), yet there is the subject ('I am').
On account of their structural similarity these two independent
patterns appear one superimposed on the other; and when there is failure
to distinguish between these patterns, the subject comes to be identified with the eye (and mutatis mutandis for the other āyatanāni). See VIÑÑĀNA
for an account of how, in a similar way, consciousness comes to be
superimposed on the eye (and the six-based body generally).
