Ignorance screens the truth. it is on that screen that people paint pictures and write underneath their labels "god" and "not-god" and "theism" and "atheism".
Nanamoli Thera
An earliest point of nescience, monks, is not manifest: 'Before this, nescience was not; then afterwards it came into being'. Even if that is said thus, monks, nevertheless it is manifest: 'With this as condition, nescience'. I say, monks, that nescience, too, is with sustenance, not without sustenance*. A. X,61 (v, 113)
An earliest point of craving-for-being, monks, is not manifest: 'Before this, craving-for-being was not; then afterwards it came into being'. Even if that is said thus, monks, nevertheless it is manifest: 'With this as condition, craving-for-being'. I say, monks, that craving-for-being, too, is with sustenance, not without sustenance. And what is the sustenance of craving-for-being? 'Nescience' would be the reply**. A. X,62 (v, 116)
You say that, as far as you see it, the arahat's experience functions automatically. By this I presume that you mean it functions without any self or agent or master to direct it. But I do not say otherwise. All that I would add is that this automatically functioning experience has a complex teleological structure.
At Savatthı̄. “Bhikkhus, for the fool, hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving, this body has thereby originated. So there is this body and external name-and-form: thus this dyad. Dependent on the dyad there is contact. There are just six sense bases, contacted through which—or through a certain one among them—the fool experiences pleasure and pain.
“Bhikkhus, for the wise man, hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving, this body has thereby originated. So there is this body and external name-and-form: thus this dyad. Dependent on the dyad there is contact. There are just six sense bases, contacted through which—or through a certain one among them—the wise man experiences pleasure and pain. What, bhikkhus, is the distinction here, what is the disparity, what is the difference between the wise man and the fool?”
“Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One, guided by the Blessed One, take recourse in the Blessed One. It would be good if the Blessed One would clear up the meaning of this statement. Having heard it from him, the bhikkhus will remember it.”
“Then listen and attend closely, bhikkhus, I will speak.”
“Yes, venerable sir,” the bhikkhus replied. The Blessed One said this:
“Bhikkhus, for the fool, hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving, this body has originated. For the fool that ignorance has not been abandoned and that craving has not been utterly destroyed. For what reason? Because the fool has not lived the holy life for the complete destruction of suffering. Therefore, with the breakup of the body, the fool fares on to body. Faring on to body, he is not freed from birth, aging, and death; not freed from sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair; not freed from suffering, I say.
“Bhikkhus, for the wise man, hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving, this body has originated. For the wise man that ignorance has been abandoned and that craving has been utterly destroyed. For what reason? Because the wise man has lived the holy life for the complete destruction of suffering. Therefore, with the breakup of the body, the wise man does not fare on to body. Not faring on to body, he is freed from birth, aging, and death; freed from sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair; freed from suffering, I say.
“This, bhikkhus, is the distinction, the disparity, the difference between the wise man and the fool, that is, the living of the holy life.” SN 12: 19
Cunda, that one who is himself sinking in the mud should pull out another who is sinking in the mud is impossible; that one who is not himself sinking in the mud should pull out another who is sinking in the mud is possible. That one who is himself untamed, undisciplined, unextinguished, should tame another, discipline him, and help extinguish is impossible; that one who is himself tamed, disciplined, extinguished, should tame another, discipline him, and help extinguish is possible. M 8
These four, O Monks, are distortions of perception, distortions of thought distortions of view...
"Whenever any monks or brahmans see self in its various forms, they all of them see the five aggregates affected by clinging, or one or another of them. Here an untaught ordinary man who disregards noble ones ... sees form as self, or self as possessed of form, or form as in self, or self as in form (or he does likewise with the other four aggregates). So he has this (rationalized) seeing, and he has also this (fundamental) attitude 'I am'; but as long as there is the attitude 'I am' there is organization of the five faculties of eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body. Then there is mind, and there are ideas, and there is the element of ignorance. When an untaught ordinary man is touched by feeling born of the contact of ignorance, it occurs to him 'I am' and 'I am this' and 'I shall be' and 'I shall not be' and 'I shall be with form' and 'I shall be formless' and 'I shall be percipient' and 'I shall be unpercipient' and 'I shall be neither percipient nor unpercipient.' But in the case of the well-taught noble disciple, while the five sense faculties remain as they are, his ignorance about them is abandoned and true knowledge arisen. With that it no more occurs to him 'I am' or ... 'I shall be neither percipient nor unpercipient.' " S. 22:47
Nanamoli Thera
An earliest point of nescience, monks, is not manifest: 'Before this, nescience was not; then afterwards it came into being'. Even if that is said thus, monks, nevertheless it is manifest: 'With this as condition, nescience'. I say, monks, that nescience, too, is with sustenance, not without sustenance*. A. X,61 (v, 113)
An earliest point of craving-for-being, monks, is not manifest: 'Before this, craving-for-being was not; then afterwards it came into being'. Even if that is said thus, monks, nevertheless it is manifest: 'With this as condition, craving-for-being'. I say, monks, that craving-for-being, too, is with sustenance, not without sustenance. And what is the sustenance of craving-for-being? 'Nescience' would be the reply**. A. X,62 (v, 116)
* 'There cannot be "nothingness of consciousness" before consciousness.' B&N, p. lv. Cf. A NOTE ON PATICCASAMUPPĀDA §§24 & 25.
'Consequently it is impossible at any particular moment when we
consider a For-itself, to apprehend it as not-yet-having a Past.' B&N, p. 138. '...there can be no consciousness without a past.' B&N, p. 138.
** 'Fundamentally
man is the desire to be, and the existence of this desire is not to be
established by an empirical induction; it is the result of an a priori
description of the being of the for-itself, since desire is a lack and
since the for-itself is the being which is to itself its own lack of
being.' B&N, p. 565.
You say that, as far as you see it, the arahat's experience functions automatically. By this I presume that you mean it functions without any self or agent or master to direct it. But I do not say otherwise. All that I would add is that this automatically functioning experience has a complex teleological structure.
The puthujjana's experience, however, is still more complex, since there is also avijjā, and there is thus appropriation as well as teleology. But this, too, functions automatically, without any self or agent to direct it. On account of the appropriation, however, it appears to be directed by a self, agent, or master.
Avijjā functions automatically, but conceals this fact from itself. Avijjā is an automatically functioning blindness to its automatic functioning.
Removal of the blindness removes the appropriation but not the
teleology.
Nanavira Thera (from letter)
At Savatthı̄. “Bhikkhus, for the fool, hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving, this body has thereby originated. So there is this body and external name-and-form: thus this dyad. Dependent on the dyad there is contact. There are just six sense bases, contacted through which—or through a certain one among them—the fool experiences pleasure and pain.
“Bhikkhus, for the wise man, hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving, this body has thereby originated. So there is this body and external name-and-form: thus this dyad. Dependent on the dyad there is contact. There are just six sense bases, contacted through which—or through a certain one among them—the wise man experiences pleasure and pain. What, bhikkhus, is the distinction here, what is the disparity, what is the difference between the wise man and the fool?”
“Venerable sir, our teachings are rooted in the Blessed One, guided by the Blessed One, take recourse in the Blessed One. It would be good if the Blessed One would clear up the meaning of this statement. Having heard it from him, the bhikkhus will remember it.”
“Then listen and attend closely, bhikkhus, I will speak.”
“Yes, venerable sir,” the bhikkhus replied. The Blessed One said this:
“Bhikkhus, for the fool, hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving, this body has originated. For the fool that ignorance has not been abandoned and that craving has not been utterly destroyed. For what reason? Because the fool has not lived the holy life for the complete destruction of suffering. Therefore, with the breakup of the body, the fool fares on to body. Faring on to body, he is not freed from birth, aging, and death; not freed from sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair; not freed from suffering, I say.
“Bhikkhus, for the wise man, hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving, this body has originated. For the wise man that ignorance has been abandoned and that craving has been utterly destroyed. For what reason? Because the wise man has lived the holy life for the complete destruction of suffering. Therefore, with the breakup of the body, the wise man does not fare on to body. Not faring on to body, he is freed from birth, aging, and death; freed from sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair; freed from suffering, I say.
“This, bhikkhus, is the distinction, the disparity, the difference between the wise man and the fool, that is, the living of the holy life.” SN 12: 19
Cunda, that one who is himself sinking in the mud should pull out another who is sinking in the mud is impossible; that one who is not himself sinking in the mud should pull out another who is sinking in the mud is possible. That one who is himself untamed, undisciplined, unextinguished, should tame another, discipline him, and help extinguish is impossible; that one who is himself tamed, disciplined, extinguished, should tame another, discipline him, and help extinguish is possible. M 8
These four, O Monks, are distortions of perception, distortions of thought distortions of view...
Sensing no change in the changing,
Sensing pleasure in suffering,
Assuming "self" where there's no self,
Sensing the un-lovely as lovely —
Gone astray with wrong views, beings
Mis-perceive with distorted minds.
Bound in the bondage of Mara,
Those people are far from safety.
They're beings that go on flowing:
Going again from death to birth.
But when in the world of darkness
Buddhas arise to make things bright,
They present this profound teaching
Which brings suffering to an end.
When those with wisdom have heard this,
They recuperate their right mind:
They see change in what is changing,
Suffering where there's suffering,
"Non-self" in what is without self,
They see the un-lovely as such.
By this acceptance of right view,
They overcome all suffering.
At Savatthi. “Bhikkhus, I do not dispute with the world; rather, it is the world that disputes with me. A proponent of the Dhamma does not dispute with anyone in the world. Of that which the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, I too say that it does not exist. And of that which the wise in the world agree upon as existing, I too say that it exists.
“And what is it, bhikkhus, that the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, of which I too say that it does not exist? Form that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, and I too say that it does not exist. Feeling … Perception … Determinations … Consciousness that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, and I too say that it does not exist.
“That, bhikkhus, is what the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, of which I too say that it does not exist.
“And what is it, bhikkhus, that the wise in the world agree upon as existing, of which I too say that it exists? Form that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists. Feeling … Perception …Determinations … Consciousness that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists.
“That, bhikkhus, is what the wise in the world agree upon as existing, of which I too say that it exists.
“There is, bhikkhus, a world-phenomenon in the world to which the Tathagata has awakened and broken through. Having done so, he explains it, teaches it, proclaims it, establishes it, discloses it, analyses it, elucidates it.
“And what is that world-phenomenon in the world to which the Tathagata has awakened and broken through? Form, bhikkhus, is a world-phenomenon in the world to which the Tathagata has awakened and broken through. Having done so, he explains it, teaches it, proclaims it, establishes it, discloses it, analyses it, elucidates it. When it is being thus explained … … and elucidated by the Tathagata, if anyone does not know and see, how can I do anything with that foolish worldling, blind and sightless, who does not know and does not see?
“Feeling … Perception … Determinations … Consciousness is a world-phenomenon in the world to which the Tathagata has awakened and broken through. Having done so, he explains it, teaches it, proclaims it, establishes it, discloses it, analyses it, elucidates it. When it is being thus explained … and elucidated by the Tathagata, if anyone does not know and see, how can I do anything with that foolish worldling, blind and sightless, who does not know and does not see?
“Bhikkhus, just as a blue, red, or white lotus is born in the water and grows up in the water, but having risen up above the water, it stands unsullied by the water, so too the Tathagata was born in the world and grew up in the world, but having overcome the world, he dwells unsullied by the world.” SN 22: 94
At Savatthi. “Bhikkhus, I do not dispute with the world; rather, it is the world that disputes with me. A proponent of the Dhamma does not dispute with anyone in the world. Of that which the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, I too say that it does not exist. And of that which the wise in the world agree upon as existing, I too say that it exists.
“And what is it, bhikkhus, that the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, of which I too say that it does not exist? Form that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, and I too say that it does not exist. Feeling … Perception … Determinations … Consciousness that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, and I too say that it does not exist.
“That, bhikkhus, is what the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, of which I too say that it does not exist.
“And what is it, bhikkhus, that the wise in the world agree upon as existing, of which I too say that it exists? Form that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists. Feeling … Perception …Determinations … Consciousness that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists.
“That, bhikkhus, is what the wise in the world agree upon as existing, of which I too say that it exists.
“There is, bhikkhus, a world-phenomenon in the world to which the Tathagata has awakened and broken through. Having done so, he explains it, teaches it, proclaims it, establishes it, discloses it, analyses it, elucidates it.
“And what is that world-phenomenon in the world to which the Tathagata has awakened and broken through? Form, bhikkhus, is a world-phenomenon in the world to which the Tathagata has awakened and broken through. Having done so, he explains it, teaches it, proclaims it, establishes it, discloses it, analyses it, elucidates it. When it is being thus explained … … and elucidated by the Tathagata, if anyone does not know and see, how can I do anything with that foolish worldling, blind and sightless, who does not know and does not see?
“Feeling … Perception … Determinations … Consciousness is a world-phenomenon in the world to which the Tathagata has awakened and broken through. Having done so, he explains it, teaches it, proclaims it, establishes it, discloses it, analyses it, elucidates it. When it is being thus explained … and elucidated by the Tathagata, if anyone does not know and see, how can I do anything with that foolish worldling, blind and sightless, who does not know and does not see?
“Bhikkhus, just as a blue, red, or white lotus is born in the water and grows up in the water, but having risen up above the water, it stands unsullied by the water, so too the Tathagata was born in the world and grew up in the world, but having overcome the world, he dwells unsullied by the world.” SN 22: 94
"Whenever any monks or brahmans see self in its various forms, they all of them see the five aggregates affected by clinging, or one or another of them. Here an untaught ordinary man who disregards noble ones ... sees form as self, or self as possessed of form, or form as in self, or self as in form (or he does likewise with the other four aggregates). So he has this (rationalized) seeing, and he has also this (fundamental) attitude 'I am'; but as long as there is the attitude 'I am' there is organization of the five faculties of eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body. Then there is mind, and there are ideas, and there is the element of ignorance. When an untaught ordinary man is touched by feeling born of the contact of ignorance, it occurs to him 'I am' and 'I am this' and 'I shall be' and 'I shall not be' and 'I shall be with form' and 'I shall be formless' and 'I shall be percipient' and 'I shall be unpercipient' and 'I shall be neither percipient nor unpercipient.' But in the case of the well-taught noble disciple, while the five sense faculties remain as they are, his ignorance about them is abandoned and true knowledge arisen. With that it no more occurs to him 'I am' or ... 'I shall be neither percipient nor unpercipient.' " S. 22:47
Personality view, or embodiment view:
"Embodiment": sakkaya = sa
(either "existing" or "own") plus kaya
(body).
The identification of self (atta) with one or more of the five
aggregates
thus constitutes an "embodiment" of that self,
and that establishes a wrong view.
*
A further point. When an arahat is talking
to people he will normally follow linguistic usage and speak of 'I' and
'me' and 'mine' and so on; but he no longer (mis)understands these
words as does the puthujjana. Nanavira Thera (from letter).
Then the Venerable Sāriputta approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, and sat down to one side. The Blessed One then said to him:
“Sāriputta, I can teach the Dhamma briefly; I can teach the Dhamma in detail; I can teach the Dhamma both briefly and in detail. It is those who can understand that are rare.”
“It is the time for this, Blessed One. It is the time for this, Fortunate One. The Blessed One should teach the Dhamma briefly; he should teach the Dhamma in detail; he should teach the Dhamma both briefly and in detail. There will be those who can understand the Dhamma.”
“Therefore, Sāriputta, you should train yourselves thus: (1) ‘There will be no I-making, mine-making, and underlying tendency to conceit in regard to this conscious body; (2) there will be no I-making, mine-making, and underlying tendency to conceit in regard to all external objects; and (3) we will enter and dwell in that liberation of mind, liberation by wisdom, through which there is no more I-making, mine-making, and underlying tendency to conceit for one who enters and dwells in it.’ It is in this way, Sāriputta, that you should train yourselves.
“When, Sāriputta, a bhikkhu has no I-making, mine-making, and underlying tendency to conceit in regard to this conscious body; when he has no I-making, mine-making, and underlying tendency to conceit in regard to all external objects; and when he enters and dwells in that liberation of mind, liberation by wisdom, through which there is no more I-making, mine-making, and underlying tendency to conceit for one who enters and dwells in it, he is called a bhikkhu who has cut off craving, stripped off the fetter, and, by completely breaking through conceit, has made an end of suffering. And it was with reference to this that I said in the Pārāyana, in ‘The Questions of Udaya’:
“The abandoning of both
sensual perceptions and dejection;
the dispelling of dullness,
the warding off of remorse;
“purified equanimity and mindfulness
preceded by reflection on the Dhamma:
this, I say, is emancipation by final knowledge,
the breaking up of ignorance.”
*
The ordinary person (the puthujjana or 'commoner') thinks, 'I feel; I perceive; I determine; I cognize', and he takes this 'I' to refer to some kind of timeless and changeless ego or 'self'. But the arahat has completely got rid of the ego-illusion (the conceit or concept 'I am'), and, when he reflects, thinks quite simply, 'Feeling feels; perception perceives; determinations determine; consciousness
cognizes'. Perhaps this may help you to see how it is that when desire
(craving) ceases altogether 'the various things just stand there in the
world'. Obviously they cannot 'just stand there in the world' unless
they are felt, perceived, determined and cognized (Berkeley's esse est percipi is, in principle, quite correct); but for the living arahat the question 'Who
feels, perceives, determines, cognizes, the various things?' no longer
arises—the various things are felt by feeling, perceived by perception,
determined by determinations, and cognized by consciousness; in other
words, they are 'there in the world' autonomously (actually they always were, but the puthujjana does not see this since he takes himself for granted). With the breaking up of the arahat's
body (his death) all this ceases. (For other people, of course, these
things continue unless and until they in their turn, having become arahats, arrive at the end of their final existence.)
Then the Venerable Sāriputta approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, and sat down to one side. The Blessed One then said to him:
“Sāriputta, I can teach the Dhamma briefly; I can teach the Dhamma in detail; I can teach the Dhamma both briefly and in detail. It is those who can understand that are rare.”
“It is the time for this, Blessed One. It is the time for this, Fortunate One. The Blessed One should teach the Dhamma briefly; he should teach the Dhamma in detail; he should teach the Dhamma both briefly and in detail. There will be those who can understand the Dhamma.”
“Therefore, Sāriputta, you should train yourselves thus: (1) ‘There will be no I-making, mine-making, and underlying tendency to conceit in regard to this conscious body; (2) there will be no I-making, mine-making, and underlying tendency to conceit in regard to all external objects; and (3) we will enter and dwell in that liberation of mind, liberation by wisdom, through which there is no more I-making, mine-making, and underlying tendency to conceit for one who enters and dwells in it.’ It is in this way, Sāriputta, that you should train yourselves.
“When, Sāriputta, a bhikkhu has no I-making, mine-making, and underlying tendency to conceit in regard to this conscious body; when he has no I-making, mine-making, and underlying tendency to conceit in regard to all external objects; and when he enters and dwells in that liberation of mind, liberation by wisdom, through which there is no more I-making, mine-making, and underlying tendency to conceit for one who enters and dwells in it, he is called a bhikkhu who has cut off craving, stripped off the fetter, and, by completely breaking through conceit, has made an end of suffering. And it was with reference to this that I said in the Pārāyana, in ‘The Questions of Udaya’:
“The abandoning of both
sensual perceptions and dejection;
the dispelling of dullness,
the warding off of remorse;
“purified equanimity and mindfulness
preceded by reflection on the Dhamma:
this, I say, is emancipation by final knowledge,
the breaking up of ignorance.”
AN 3: 33
At Savatthi. Now on that occasion the Blessed One was instructing, exhorting, inspiring, and gladdening the bhikkhus with a Dhamma talk concerning Nibbana. And those bhikkhus were listening to the Dhamma with eager ears, attending to it as a matter of vital concern, applying their whole minds to it.
Then it occurred to Mara the Evil One: “This ascetic Gotama is instructing, exhorting, inspiring, and gladdening the bhikkhus … who are applying their whole minds to it. Let me approach the ascetic Gotama in order to confound them.” Then Mara the Evil One manifested himself in the form of a farmer, carrying a large plough on his shoulder, holding a long goad stick, his hair dishevelled , wearing hempen garments, his feet smeared with mud. He approached the Blessed One and said to smeared with mud. He approached the Blessed One and said to him: “Maybe you’ve seen oxen, ascetic?”
“What are oxen to you, Evil One?”
“The eye is mine, ascetic, forms are mine, eye-contact and its base of consciousness are mine. Where can you go, ascetic, to escape from me? The ear is mine, ascetic, sounds are mine … The nose is mine, ascetic, odours are mine … The tongue is mine, ascetic, tastes are mine … The body is mine, ascetic, tactile objects are mine … The mind is mine, ascetic, mental phenomena are mine, mind-contact and its base of consciousness are mine. Where can you go, ascetic, to escape from me?”
“The eye is yours, Evil One, forms are yours, eye-contact and its base of consciousness are yours; but, Evil One, where there is no eye, no forms, no eye-contact and its base of consciousness—there is no place for you there, Evil One. The ear is yours, Evil One, sounds are yours, ear-contact and its base of consciousness are yours; but, Evil One, where there is no ear, no sounds, no ear-contact and its base of consciousness—there is no place for you there, Evil One. The nose is yours, Evil One, odours are yours, nose-contact and its base of consciousness are yours; but, Evil One, where there is no nose, no odours, no nose-contact and its base of consciousness—there is no place for you there, Evil One. The tongue is yours, Evil One, tastes are yours, tongue-contact and its base of consciousness are yours; but, Evil One, where there is no tongue, no tastes, no tongue-contact and its base of consciousness—there is no place for you there, Evil One. The body is yours, Evil One, tactile objects are yours, body-contact and its base of consciousness are yours; but, Evil One, where there is no body, no tactile objects, no body-contact and its base of consciousness—there is no place for you there, Evil One. The mind is yours, Evil One, mental phenomena are yours, mind-contact and its base of consciousness are yours; but, Evil One, where there is no mind, no mental phenomena, no mind-contact and its base of consciousness—there is no place for you there, Evil One.”
SN 4: 19
At Savatthi. Then a certain bhikkhu approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and said to him:
“Venerable sir, how should one know, how should one see, for ignorance to be abandoned and true knowledge to arise?”
“Bhikkhu, when one knows and sees the eye as impermanent, ignorance is abandoned and true knowledge arises. When one knows and sees forms as impermanent … When one knows and sees as impermanent whatever feeling arises with mind-contact as condition—whether pleasant or painful or neither-painful-norpleasant—ignorance is abandoned and true knowledge arises. When one knows and sees thus, bhikkhu, ignorance is abandoned and true knowledge arises.” SN 35: 53
Then a certain bhikkhu approached the Blessed One … and said to him: “Venerable sir, is there one thing through the abandoning of which ignorance is abandoned by a bhikkhu and true knowledge arises?”
“There is one thing, bhikkhu, through the abandoning of which ignorance is abandoned by a bhikkhu and true knowledge arises.”
“And what is that one thing, venerable sir?”
“Ignorance, bhikkhu, is that one thing through the abandoning of which ignorance is abandoned by a bhikkhu and true knowledge arises.”
“But, venerable sir, how should a bhikkhu know, how should he see, for ignorance to be abandoned by him and true knowledge to arise?”
“Bhikkhu, when a bhikkhu knows and sees the eye as impermanent, ignorance is abandoned by him and true knowledge arises. When he knows and sees forms as impermanent … When he knows and sees as impermanent whatever feeling arises with mind-contact as condition … ignorance is abandoned by him and true knowledge arises.
“When, bhikkhu, a bhikkhu knows and sees thus, ignorance is abandoned by him and true knowledge arises.” SN 35: 79
We must now again ask the question of §17: 'What about the first item of the paticcasamuppāda formulation—since there is no item preceding it, is it therefore permanent?'. The first item is now avijjā, and the Buddha himself answers the question in a Sutta of the Anguttara Nikāya (X,vii,1 <A.v,113>). This answer is to the effect that avijjā depends upon not hearing and not practising the Dhamma. It is not, however, the only way of answering the question, as we may see from the Sammāditthisutta (Majjhima i,9 <M.i,54>). Here we find that avijjā depends upon āsavā, and āsavā depend upon avijjā. But one of the āsavā is, precisely, avijj'āsava, which seems to indicate that avijjā depends upon avijjā.[k] Let us see if this is so. We know that sankhārā depend upon avijjā—avijjāpaccayā sankhārā. But since something that something else depends upon is a sankhāra, it is evident that avijjā is a sankhāra. And, as before, sankhārā depend upon avijjā. Thus avijjā depends upon avijjā. Far from being a logical trick, this result reflects a structural feature of the first importance.[l] Before discussing it, however, we must note that this result leads us to expect that any condition upon which avijjā depends will itself involve avijjā implicitly or explicitly. (In terms of §23 the foregoing argument runs thus. Avijjāpaccayā sankhārā may be taken as 'with non-seeing of paticcasamuppāda as condition there is paticcasamuppāda'. But this itself is seen only when paticcasamuppāda is seen; for paticcasamuppāda cannot be seen as paticcasamuppanna before paticcasamuppāda is seen. To see avijjā or non-seeing, avijjā or non-seeing must cease. Avijjā therefore comes first; for, being its own condition, it can have no anterior term that does not itself involve avijjā.)
And which, monks, is the noble truth of suffering...
And which, monks, is the noble truth of arising of suffering...
And which, monks, is the noble truth of ceasing of suffering...
And which, monks, is the noble truth of the way that leads to ceasing of suffering?
Just this noble eight-factored path,
that is to say: right view...
And which, monks, is right view?...
That which is knowledge of suffering,
knowledge of arising of suffering,
knowledge of ceasing of suffering,
knowledge of the way that leads to ceasing of suffering,
this, monks, is called right view.
Nanavira Thera (from A NOTE ON PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA)
At Savatthi. Now on that occasion the Blessed One was instructing, exhorting, inspiring, and gladdening the bhikkhus with a Dhamma talk concerning Nibbana. And those bhikkhus were listening to the Dhamma with eager ears, attending to it as a matter of vital concern, applying their whole minds to it.
Then it occurred to Mara the Evil One: “This ascetic Gotama is instructing, exhorting, inspiring, and gladdening the bhikkhus … who are applying their whole minds to it. Let me approach the ascetic Gotama in order to confound them.” Then Mara the Evil One manifested himself in the form of a farmer, carrying a large plough on his shoulder, holding a long goad stick, his hair dishevelled , wearing hempen garments, his feet smeared with mud. He approached the Blessed One and said to smeared with mud. He approached the Blessed One and said to him: “Maybe you’ve seen oxen, ascetic?”
“What are oxen to you, Evil One?”
“The eye is mine, ascetic, forms are mine, eye-contact and its base of consciousness are mine. Where can you go, ascetic, to escape from me? The ear is mine, ascetic, sounds are mine … The nose is mine, ascetic, odours are mine … The tongue is mine, ascetic, tastes are mine … The body is mine, ascetic, tactile objects are mine … The mind is mine, ascetic, mental phenomena are mine, mind-contact and its base of consciousness are mine. Where can you go, ascetic, to escape from me?”
“The eye is yours, Evil One, forms are yours, eye-contact and its base of consciousness are yours; but, Evil One, where there is no eye, no forms, no eye-contact and its base of consciousness—there is no place for you there, Evil One. The ear is yours, Evil One, sounds are yours, ear-contact and its base of consciousness are yours; but, Evil One, where there is no ear, no sounds, no ear-contact and its base of consciousness—there is no place for you there, Evil One. The nose is yours, Evil One, odours are yours, nose-contact and its base of consciousness are yours; but, Evil One, where there is no nose, no odours, no nose-contact and its base of consciousness—there is no place for you there, Evil One. The tongue is yours, Evil One, tastes are yours, tongue-contact and its base of consciousness are yours; but, Evil One, where there is no tongue, no tastes, no tongue-contact and its base of consciousness—there is no place for you there, Evil One. The body is yours, Evil One, tactile objects are yours, body-contact and its base of consciousness are yours; but, Evil One, where there is no body, no tactile objects, no body-contact and its base of consciousness—there is no place for you there, Evil One. The mind is yours, Evil One, mental phenomena are yours, mind-contact and its base of consciousness are yours; but, Evil One, where there is no mind, no mental phenomena, no mind-contact and its base of consciousness—there is no place for you there, Evil One.”
“That of which they say ‘It’s mine,’
And those who speak in terms of ‘mine’—
If your mind exists among these,
You won’t escape me, ascetic.”
“That which they speak of is not mine,Then Mara the Evil One … disappeared right there.
I’m not one of those who speak .
You should know thus, O Evil One:
Even my path you will not see.”
SN 4: 19
At Savatthi. Then a certain bhikkhu approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and said to him:
“Venerable sir, how should one know, how should one see, for ignorance to be abandoned and true knowledge to arise?”
“Bhikkhu, when one knows and sees the eye as impermanent, ignorance is abandoned and true knowledge arises. When one knows and sees forms as impermanent … When one knows and sees as impermanent whatever feeling arises with mind-contact as condition—whether pleasant or painful or neither-painful-norpleasant—ignorance is abandoned and true knowledge arises. When one knows and sees thus, bhikkhu, ignorance is abandoned and true knowledge arises.” SN 35: 53
Then a certain bhikkhu approached the Blessed One … and said to him: “Venerable sir, is there one thing through the abandoning of which ignorance is abandoned by a bhikkhu and true knowledge arises?”
“There is one thing, bhikkhu, through the abandoning of which ignorance is abandoned by a bhikkhu and true knowledge arises.”
“And what is that one thing, venerable sir?”
“Ignorance, bhikkhu, is that one thing through the abandoning of which ignorance is abandoned by a bhikkhu and true knowledge arises.”
“But, venerable sir, how should a bhikkhu know, how should he see, for ignorance to be abandoned by him and true knowledge to arise?”
“Bhikkhu, when a bhikkhu knows and sees the eye as impermanent, ignorance is abandoned by him and true knowledge arises. When he knows and sees forms as impermanent … When he knows and sees as impermanent whatever feeling arises with mind-contact as condition … ignorance is abandoned by him and true knowledge arises.
“When, bhikkhu, a bhikkhu knows and sees thus, ignorance is abandoned by him and true knowledge arises.” SN 35: 79
We must now again ask the question of §17: 'What about the first item of the paticcasamuppāda formulation—since there is no item preceding it, is it therefore permanent?'. The first item is now avijjā, and the Buddha himself answers the question in a Sutta of the Anguttara Nikāya (X,vii,1 <A.v,113>). This answer is to the effect that avijjā depends upon not hearing and not practising the Dhamma. It is not, however, the only way of answering the question, as we may see from the Sammāditthisutta (Majjhima i,9 <M.i,54>). Here we find that avijjā depends upon āsavā, and āsavā depend upon avijjā. But one of the āsavā is, precisely, avijj'āsava, which seems to indicate that avijjā depends upon avijjā.[k] Let us see if this is so. We know that sankhārā depend upon avijjā—avijjāpaccayā sankhārā. But since something that something else depends upon is a sankhāra, it is evident that avijjā is a sankhāra. And, as before, sankhārā depend upon avijjā. Thus avijjā depends upon avijjā. Far from being a logical trick, this result reflects a structural feature of the first importance.[l] Before discussing it, however, we must note that this result leads us to expect that any condition upon which avijjā depends will itself involve avijjā implicitly or explicitly. (In terms of §23 the foregoing argument runs thus. Avijjāpaccayā sankhārā may be taken as 'with non-seeing of paticcasamuppāda as condition there is paticcasamuppāda'. But this itself is seen only when paticcasamuppāda is seen; for paticcasamuppāda cannot be seen as paticcasamuppanna before paticcasamuppāda is seen. To see avijjā or non-seeing, avijjā or non-seeing must cease. Avijjā therefore comes first; for, being its own condition, it can have no anterior term that does not itself involve avijjā.)
The faculty of self-observation or reflexion
is inherent in the structure of our experience. Some degree of
reflexion is almost never entirely absent in our waking life, and in the
practice of mindfulness it is deliberately cultivated. To describe it
simply, we may say that one part of our experience is immediately
concerned with the world as its object, while at the same time another
part of our experience is concerned with the immediate experience as its
object. This second part we may call reflexive experience. (Reflexion is discussed in greater detail in Shorter Notes & FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE.) It will be clear that when there is avijjā there is avijjā in both
parts of our experience, the immediate and the reflexive; for though,
in reflexion, experience is divided within itself, it is still one
single, even if complex, structure. The effect of this may be seen from
the Sabbāsavasutta (Majjhima i,2 <M.i,8>) wherein certain wrong
views are spoken of. Three of them are: Attanā va attānam sañjānāmī ti; Attanā va anattānam sañjānāmī ti; and Anattanā va attānam sañjānāmī ti. ('With self I perceive self; With self I perceive not-self; With not-self I perceive self.') A man with avijjā,
practising reflexion, may identify 'self' with both reflexive and
immediate experience, or with reflexive experience alone, or with
immediate experience alone. He does not conclude that neither is 'self', and the reason is clear: it is not possible to get outside avijjā by means of reflexion alone; for however much a man may 'step back' from himself to observe himself he cannot help taking avijjā with him. There is just as much avijjā in the self-observer as there is in the self-observed. (See CETANĀ [b].) And this is the very reason why avijjā is so stable in spite of its being sankhatā.[m] Simply by reflexion the puthujjana can never observe avijjā and at the same time recognize it as avijjā; for in reflexion avijjā is the Judge as well as the Accused, and the verdict is always 'Not Guilty'. In order to put an end to avijjā, which is a matter of recognizing avijjā as avijjā, it is necessary to accept on trust from the Buddha a Teaching that contradicts the direct evidence of the puthujjana's reflexion. This is why the Dhamma is patisotagāmī (Majjhima iii,6 <M.i,168>), or 'going against the stream'. The Dhamma gives the puthujjana the outside view of avijjā, which is inherently unobtainable for him by unaided reflexion (in the ariyasāvaka this view has, as it were, 'taken' like a graft, and is perpetually available). Thus it will be seen that avijjā in reflexive experience (actual or potential) is the condition for avijjā in immediate experience. It is possible, also, to take a second step back and reflect upon reflexion; but there is still avijjā in this self-observation of self-observation, and we have a third layer of avijjā
protecting the first two. And there is no reason in theory why we
should stop here; but however far we go we shall not get beyond avijjā. The hierarchy of avijjā can also be seen from the Suttas in the following way.
Katamā pan'āvuso avijjā....
Yam kho āvuso dukkhe aññānam,
dukkhasamudaye aññānam,
dukkhanirodhe aññānam,
dukkhanirodhagāminīpatipadāya aññānam,
ayam vuccat'āvuso avijjā. (Majjhima i,9 <M.i,54>)
Katamañ ca bhikkhave dukkham ariyasaccam...
Katamañ ca bhikkhave dukkhasamudayam ariyasaccam...
Katamañ ca bhikkhave dukkhanirodham ariyasaccam...
Katamañ ca bhikkhave dukkhanirodhagāminīpatipadā ariyasaccam.
Ayam eva ariyo atthangiko maggo,
seyyathīdam sammāditthi...
Katamā ca bhikkhave sammāditthi...
Yam kho bhikkhave dukkhe ñānam,
dukkhasamudaye ñānam,
dukkhanirodhe ñānam,
dukkhanirodhagāminīpatipadāya ñānam,
ayam vuccati bhikkhave sammāditthi.
(Dīgha ii,9 <D.ii,305-12>)
Yam kho āvuso dukkhe aññānam,
dukkhasamudaye aññānam,
dukkhanirodhe aññānam,
dukkhanirodhagāminīpatipadāya aññānam,
ayam vuccat'āvuso avijjā. (Majjhima i,9 <M.i,54>)
Katamañ ca bhikkhave dukkham ariyasaccam...
Katamañ ca bhikkhave dukkhasamudayam ariyasaccam...
Katamañ ca bhikkhave dukkhanirodham ariyasaccam...
Katamañ ca bhikkhave dukkhanirodhagāminīpatipadā ariyasaccam.
Ayam eva ariyo atthangiko maggo,
seyyathīdam sammāditthi...
Katamā ca bhikkhave sammāditthi...
Yam kho bhikkhave dukkhe ñānam,
dukkhasamudaye ñānam,
dukkhanirodhe ñānam,
dukkhanirodhagāminīpatipadāya ñānam,
ayam vuccati bhikkhave sammāditthi.
(Dīgha ii,9 <D.ii,305-12>)
But which, friends, is nescience?...
That which is non-knowledge of suffering,
non-knowledge of arising of suffering,
non-knowledge of ceasing of suffering,
non-knowledge of the way that leads to ceasing of suffering,
this, friends, is called nescience.
That which is non-knowledge of suffering,
non-knowledge of arising of suffering,
non-knowledge of ceasing of suffering,
non-knowledge of the way that leads to ceasing of suffering,
this, friends, is called nescience.
And which, monks, is the noble truth of suffering...
And which, monks, is the noble truth of arising of suffering...
And which, monks, is the noble truth of ceasing of suffering...
And which, monks, is the noble truth of the way that leads to ceasing of suffering?
Just this noble eight-factored path,
that is to say: right view...
And which, monks, is right view?...
That which is knowledge of suffering,
knowledge of arising of suffering,
knowledge of ceasing of suffering,
knowledge of the way that leads to ceasing of suffering,
this, monks, is called right view.
Avijjā is non-knowledge of the four noble truths. Sammāditthi is knowledge of the four noble truths. But sammāditthi is part of the four noble truths. Thus avijjā is non-knowledge of sammāditthi; that is to say, non-knowledge of knowledge of the four noble truths. But since sammāditthi, which is knowledge of the four noble truths, is part of the four noble truths, so avijjā is non-knowledge of knowledge of knowledge
of the four noble truths. And so we can go on indefinitely. But the
point to be noted is that each of these successive stages represents an
additional layer of (potentially) reflexive avijjā. Non-knowledge of knowledge of the four noble truths is non-knowledge of vijjā, and non-knowledge of vijjā is failure to recognize avijjā as avijjā. Conversely, it is evident that when avijjā
is once recognized anywhere in this structure it must vanish
everywhere; for knowledge of the four noble truths entails knowledge of knowledge of the four noble truths, and vijjā ('science') replaces avijjā ('nescience') throughout.*
* Compare also the following: Rūpā [Saddā ... Dhammā] loke piyarūpam sātarūpam, etth'esā tanhā uppajjamānā uppajjati ettha nivisamānā nivisati ... Rūpatanhā [Saddatanhā ... Dhammatanhā] loke piyarūpam sātarūpam, etth'esā tanhā uppajjamānā uppajjati ettha nivisamānā nivisati.
('Visible forms [Sounds ... Images (Ideas)] are dear and agreeable in
the world; herein this craving arises, herein it adheres ...
Craving-for-visible-forms [Craving-for-sounds ... Craving-for-images
(-ideas)] is dear and agreeable in the world; herein this craving
arises, herein it adheres.')
And the converse:
...etth'esā tanhā pahīyamānā pahīyati ettha nirujjhamānā nirujjhati. ('...herein this craving is eliminated, herein it ceases.') Dīgha ii,9 <D.ii,308-11>
Not only is there craving, but there is craving for craving as a condition for craving: indifference to craving destroys it. (Tanhā, be it noted, is not the coarse hankering after what we do not have [which is abhijjhā or covetousness], but the subtle craving for more of what we have. In particular, I am because I crave to be, and with cessation of craving-for-being [bhavatanhā, which is itself dependent on avijjā and, like it, without first beginning—Anguttara X,vii,2 <A.v,116>], 'I am' ceases. Bhavatanhā, in fact, is the craving for more craving on which craving depends.)Nanavira Thera (from A NOTE ON PAṬICCASAMUPPĀDA)
