SAKKĀYA
Sakkāya is pañc'upādānakkhandhā
(Majjhima v,4 <M.i,299>), and may conveniently be translated as
'somebody' or 'person' or, abstractly, 'personality'. See PARAMATTHA SACCA, also for what follows.
An arahat (while alive—that is, if we can speak of a 'living arahat') continues to be individual in the sense that 'he' is a sequence of states (Theragāthā v. 716)* distinguishable from other arahanto (and a fortiori from individuals other than arahanto). Every set of pañcakkhandhā[a]—not pañc'upādānakkhandhā in the arahat's case—is unique, and individuality in this sense ceases only with the final cessation of the pañcakkhandhā at the breaking up of the arahat's body. But a living arahat is no longer somebody or a person, since the notion or conceit '(I) am' has already ceased. Individuality must therefore be carefully distinguished from personality,[b]
which is: being a person, being somebody, being a subject (to whom
objects are present), selfhood, the mirage 'I am', and so on. The puthujjana
is not able to distinguish them—for him individuality is not
conceivable apart from personality, which he takes as selfhood. The sotāpanna is able to distinguish them—he sees that personality or 'selfhood' is a deception dependent upon avijjā,
a deception dependent upon not seeing the deception, which is not the
case with individuality—, though he is not yet free from an aroma of
subjectivity, asmimāna. The arahat not only
distinguishes them but also has entirely got rid of all taint of
subjectivity—'he' is individual but in no way personal. For lack of
suitable expressions (which in any case would puzzle the puthujjana) 'he' is obliged to go on saying 'I' and 'me' and 'mine' (cf. Dīgha i,9 <D.i,202>; Devatā Samy. iii,5 <S.i,14>[14]). Individuality where the arahat is concerned still involves the perspective or orientation that things necessarily adopt when they exist, or are present, or are cognized; and for each individual the perspective is different. Loss of upādāna is not loss of point of view. See RŪPA and remarks on manasikāra in NĀMA.
Sakkāyaditthi
(Majjhima v,4 <M.i,300>) is sometimes explained as the view or
belief (often attributed to a purely verbal misunderstanding)[c] that in one or other of the khandhā
there is a permanent entity, a 'self'. These rationalized accounts
entirely miss the point, which is the distinction (Khandha Samy. v,6
<S.iii,47>) between pañc'upādānakkhandhā (which is sakkāya) and pañcakkhandhā (which is sakkāyanirodha). To have ditthi about sakkāya is not an optional matter (as if one could regard sakkāya from the outside and form ditthi about it or not, as one pleased): sakkāya contains sakkāyaditthi (in a latent form at least) as a necessary part of its structure.[d] If there is sakkāya there is sakkāyaditthi, and with the giving up of sakkāyaditthi there comes to be cessation of sakkāya. To give up sakkāyaditthi, sakkāya must be seen (i.e. as pañc'upādānakkhandhā), and this means that the puthujjana does not see pañc'upādānakkhandhā as such (i.e. he does not recognize them—see MAMA [a] and cf. Majjhima viii,5 <M.i,511>). A puthujjana (especially one who puts his trust in the Commentaries) sometimes comes to believe that he does see pañc'upādānakkhandhā
as such, thereby blocking his own progress and meeting with
frustration: he cannot see what further task is to be done, and yet
remains a puthujjana. Nanavira Thera
*Theragāthā 715, 716
*Theragāthā 715, 716
| 715 | Na me hoti Ahosin ti, Bhavissan ti na hoti me; Sankhārā vibhavissanti: tattha kā paridevanā. |
| 716 | Suddham dhammasamuppādam suddham sankhārasantatim Passantassa yathābhūtam na bhayam hoti gāmani. |
| 715 | 'I was' is not for me, not for me is 'I shall be'; Determinations will un-be: therein what place for sighs? |
| 716 | Pure arising of things, pure series of determinants— For one who sees this as it is, chieftain, there is no fear. |
Footnotes:
[a] Past,
future, and present, 'five aggregates': matter (or substance), feeling,
perception, determinations, and consciousness.
[b] Taken in conjunction with what follows it, this evidently means 'A puthujjana must take good care to become a sotāpanna'.
In other words, a purely intellectual distinction (i.e. without direct
experience) is not possible. (This statement perhaps requires some
modification to allow for the anulomikāya khantiyā samannāgato. One who is anulomikāya khantiyā samannāgato, though a puthujjana, is not at that time assutavā (through hearing the Dhamma he has some understanding, but he can still lose this and return to his former state). But to be anulomikāya khantiyā samannāgato
it is by no manner of means enough to have studied the Suttas and to
profess oneself a follower of the Buddha. See Anguttara VI,x,3-6
<A.iii,441-3> & CITTA. Anulomikāya khantiyā samannāgato may be translated 'endowed with acquiescence in conformity (scil. with the Dhamma)'; such an individual is not of contrary view to the Teaching, but does not actually see it for himself.).
[c] If avijjā were simply a matter of verbal misunderstanding, a maggot would be an arahat.
PARAMATTHA SACCA
1. In Bhikkhunī Samyutta 10 <S.i,135> we find these verses.
Māro pāpimā:
1 Kenāyam pakato satto, kuvam sattassa kārako,
2 Kuvam satto samuppanno, kuvam satto nirujjhatī ti.
Vajirā bhikkhunī:
3 Kin nu Sattoti paccesi, Māra, ditthigatam nu te,
4 Suddhasankhārapuñjo'yam, nayidha sattūpalabbhati;
5 Yathā hi angasambhārā hoti saddo Ratho iti,
6 Evam khandhesu santesu hoti Satto ti sammuti.
7 Dukkham eva hi sambhoti, dukkham titthati veti ca,
8 Nāññatra dukkhā sambhoti, nāññam dukkhā nirujjhatī ti.Māra the Evil One:
1 By whom is this creature formed? Who is the creature's maker?
2 Who is the arisen creature? Who is the creature that ceases?
Vajirā the nun:
3 Why do you refer to 'the creature', Māra, are you involved in (wrong) view?
4 This is a pile of pure determinations; there is, here, no creature to be found.
5 Just as for an assemblage of parts there is the term 'a chariot',
6 So, when there are the aggregates, convention says 'a creature'.
7 It is merely suffering that comes into being, suffering that stands and disappears,
8 Nothing apart from suffering comes into being, nothing other than suffering ceases.
2. The speculative questions in the first two lines are of the same order as those of the assutavā puthujjana in the Sabbāsavasutta (Majjhima i,2 <M.i,8>) ending with: Etarahi
vā paccuppannam addhānam ajjhattam kathamkathī hoti Ahan nu kho'smi, no
nu kho'smi, kin nu kho'smi, kathan nu kho'smi, ayan nu kho satto kuti
āgato, so kuhimgāmī bhavissatī ti. ('Or he is a self-questioner
about the present period: 'Am I? Am I not? What am I? How am I? This
creature—whence has it come? Whither is it bound?'') The word satta is found in both, and clearly with the same meaning. The puthujjana is speculating about himself, and satta
in this context is himself considered, with a certain detachment, as a
creature; it is a creature regarded, in one way or another, as a 'self';
for the puthujjana takes what appears to be his 'self' at face value—he regards himself as a 'self' (see ATTĀ). It is the puthujjana's
concept of a creature. The third line (the first of the reply to Māra)
confirms this; for Māra is asked, a little rhetorically perhaps, why he
refers to 'the creature', why he has this involvement in (wrong) view.
'The creature' is an involvement in (wrong) view, ditthigata, precisely when the creature is regarded in some way as 'self'; for this is sakkāyaditthi or 'personality-view', the view that one is, in essence, somebody (see SAKKĀYA). And the following passage: Kim
pana tvam Potthapāda attānam paccesī ti. Olārikam kho aham bhante
attānam paccemi.... Manomayam kho aham bhante attānam paccemi.... Arūpim
kho aham bhante attānam paccemi.... ('– But to what self,
Potthapāda, do you refer?—To a coarse self, lord, I refer.... To a
made-of-mind self, lord, I refer.... To an immaterial self, lord, I
refer....') (Dīgha i,9 <D.i,185>) allows us to understand Satto ti paccesi, reference to 'the creature', in exactly the same way, namely, the taking of the creature as 'self'.
3. Suddhasankhārapuñjo'yam follows at once; for if the regarding of the creature as 'self' is sakkāyaditthi, then the creature so regarded is sakkāya, which is the pañc'upādānakkhandhā (Majjhima v,4 <M.i,299>). And the pañc'upādānakkhandhā are sankhārā if they are what something else depends upon. What depends upon them? Na
kho āvuso Visākha taññeva upādānam te pañc'upādānakkhandhā, na pi
aññatra pañcah'upādānakkhandhehi upādānam. Yo kho āvuso Visākha
pañcas'upādānakkhandhesu chandarāgo tam tattha upādānan ti. ('The
five holding aggregates, friend Visākha, are not just holding; but
neither is there holding apart from the five holding aggregates. That,
friend Visākha, in the five holding aggregates which is
desire-&-lust, that therein is holding.') (Majjhima v,4
<M.i,299>) Upādāna, therefore, depends upon the pañc'upādānakkhandhā (as we may also see from the usual paticcasamuppāda formulation). And the fundamental upādāna is attavāda, belief in 'self'. (See A NOTE ON PATICCASAMUPPĀDA §§10, 12, & 13. Compare also Khandha Samy. ix,1 <S.iii,105>: Rūpam upādāya Asmī ti hoti no anupādāya; vedanam...; saññam...; sankhāre...; viññānam upādāya Asmī ti hoti no anupādāya. ('Holding
matter there is '(I) am', not not holding; holding feeling...; holding
perception...; holding determinations...; holding consciousness there is
'(I) am', not not holding.'))
4. Nayidha sattūpalabbhati now presents no difficulty. The puthujjana takes his apparent 'self' at face value and identifies it with the creature: the creature, for him, is 'self'—Satto ti pacceti. He does not see, however, that this identification is dependent upon his holding a belief in 'self', attavād'upādāna, and that this, too, is anicca sankhata paticcasamuppanna; for were he to see it, upādāna would vanish, and the deception would become clear—Evam
eva kho Māgandiya ahañ c'eva te dhammam deseyyam, Idan tam ārogyam idan
tam nibbānan ti, so tvam ārogyam jāneyyāsi nibbānam passeyyāsi, tassa
te saha cakkhuppādā yo pañcas'upādānakkhandhesu chandarāgo so pahīyetha;
api ca te evam assa, Dīgharattam vata bho aham iminā cittena nikato
vañcito paladdho; aham hi rūpam yeva upādiyamāno upādiyim, vedanam
yeva..., saññam yeva..., sankhāre yeva..., viññānam yeva upādiyamāno
upādiyim. ('Just so, Māgandiya, if I were to set you forth the
Teaching, 'This is that good health, this is that extinction', you might
know good health, you might see extinction; with the arising of the
eye, that in the five holding aggregates which is desire-&-lust
would be eliminated for you; moreover it would occur to you, 'For a long
time, indeed, have I been cheated and deceived and defrauded by this
mind (or heart—citta): I was holding just matter,
holding just feeling, holding just perception, holding just
determinations, holding just consciousness'.') (Majjhima viii,5
<M.i,511>). With the vanishing of belief in 'self' the
identification would cease. The ariyasāvaka, on the other hand, sees the creature as pañc'upādānakkhandhā; he sees that upādāna is dependent upon these pañc'upādānakkhandhā; and he sees that the puthujjana is a victim of upādāna and is making a mistaken identification. He sees that since the creature is pañc'upādānakkhandhā
it cannot in any way be identified as 'self'; for if it could, 'self'
would be impermanent, determined, dependently arisen; and the ariyasāvaka knows direct from his own experience, as the puthujjana does not, that perception of selfhood, of an inherent mastery over things, and perception of impermanence are incompatible. Thus nayidha sattūpalabbhati,
'there is, here, no "creature" to be found', means simply 'there is, in
this pile of pure determinations, no creature to be found such as
conceived by the puthujjana, as a "self"'. The Alagaddūpamasutta (Majjhima iii,2 <M.i,138>) has Attani ca bhikkhave attaniye ca saccato thetato anupalabbhamāne...
('Since both self, monks, and what belongs to self actually and in
truth are not to be found...'), and the meaning is no different. The
words saccato thetato, 'in truth, actually', mean 'in the (right) view of the ariyasāvaka, who sees paticcasamuppāda and its cessation'.[a]
5. The next two lines (5 & 6) contain the simile of the chariot. Just as the word 'chariot' is the name given to an assemblage of parts, so when the khandhā
are present common usage speaks of a 'creature'. What is the purpose of
this simile? In view of what has been said above the answer is not
difficult. The assutavā puthujjana sees clearly enough that a chariot is an assemblage of parts: what he does not see is that the creature is an assemblage of khandhā (suddhasankhārapuñja), and this for the reason that he regards it as 'self'. For the puthujjana
the creature exists as a 'self' exists, that is to say, as an
extra-temporal monolithic whole ('self' could never be either a thing of
parts or part of a thing).[b]
The simile shows him his mistake by pointing out that a creature exists
as a chariot exists, that is to say, as a temporal complex of parts.
When he sees this he no longer regards the creature as 'self', and, with
the giving up of sakkāyaditthi, he ceases to be a puthujjana.
6. The final two lines (7 & 8) may be discussed briefly. It is in the nature of the pañc'upādānakkhandhā to press for recognition, in one way or another, as 'self'; but the ariyasāvaka,
with his perception of impermanence, can no longer heed their
persistent solicitation; for a mastery over things (which is what
selfhood would claim to be; cf. Majjhima iv,5 <M.i,231-2> &
Khandha Samy. vi,7 <S.iii,66> [7])—a
mastery over things that is seen to be undermined by impermanence is at
once also seen to be no mastery at all, but a false security, for ever
ending in betrayal. And this is dukkha. (See DHAMMA.) Thus, when attavād'upādāna has been removed, there supervenes the right view that it is only dukkha that arises and dukkha that ceases. Upāy'upādānābhinivesavinibaddho
khvāyam Kaccāyana loko yebhuyyena; tañ cāyam upāy'upādānam cetaso
adhitthānābhinivesānusayam na upeti na upādiyati nādhitthāti, Attā me
ti. Dukkham eva uppajjamānam uppajjati, dukkham nirujjhamānam nirujjhatī
ti na kankhati na vicikicchati, aparapaccayā ñānam ev'assa ettha hoti.
Ettāvatā kho Kaccāyana sammāditthi hoti. ('This world for the most
part, Kaccāyana, is bound by engaging, holding, and adherence; and this
one [i.e. this individual] does not engage or hold or resolve that
engaging or holding, that mental resolving adherence and tendency: 'My
self'. 'It is just suffering that arises, suffering that ceases'—about
this he does not hesitate or doubt, his knowledge herein is independent
of others. So far, Kaccāyana, is there right view.') Nidāna/Abhisamaya
Samy. ii,5 <S.ii,17>
7. The question now arises whether the word satta, which we have been translating as 'creature', can be used to denote an arahat. Once it is clear that, in a right view, nothing is to be found that can be identified as 'self', the application of the word satta becomes a question of usage. Is satta simply pañc'upādānakkhandhā—in which case it is equivalent to sakkāya --, or can it be applied also to pañcakkhandhā, as the sixth line might seem to suggest? If the latter, then (at least as applied to deities and human beings) it is equivalent to puggala, which is certainly used in the Suttas to refer to an arahat (who is the first of the atthapurisapuggalā),[c] and which can be understood in the obvious sense of one set of pañcakkhandhā as distinct from all other sets—an arahat is an 'individual' in the sense that one arahat
can be distinguished from another. It is not a matter of great
importance to settle this question (which is simply a matter of finding
Sutta passages—e.g. Khandha Samy. iii,7 <S.iii,30>; Rādha Samy. 2
<S.iii,190>; Anguttara V,iv,2 <A.iii,35>—that illustrate and
fix the actual usage of the word). It is of infinitely more importance
to understand that the puthujjana will misapprehend any word of this nature that is used (attā, 'self'; bhuta, 'being'; pāna, 'animal'; sakkāya, 'person, somebody'; purisa, 'man'; manussa, 'human being'; and so on), and that the ariyasāvaka will not.
* * *
8. It is quite possible that the notion of paramattha sacca,
'truth in the highest, or ultimate, or absolute, sense' was in
existence before the time of the Milindapañha; but its use there
(Pt. II, Ch. 1) is so clear and unambiguous that that book is the
obvious point of departure for any discussion about it. The passage
quotes the two lines (5 & 6)
containing the simile of the chariot. They are used to justify the
following argument. The word 'chariot' is the conventional name given to
an assemblage of parts; but if each part is examined individually it
cannot be said of any one of them that it is the chariot, nor do we find
any chariot in the parts collectively, nor do we find any chariot
outside the parts. Therefore, 'in the highest sense', there exists no chariot. Similarly, an 'individual' (the word puggala is used) is merely a conventional name given to an assemblage of parts (parts of the body, as well as khandhā), and, 'in the highest sense', there exists no individual. That is all.
9. Let
us first consider the validity of the argument. If a chariot is taken to
pieces, and a man is then shown the pieces one by one, each time with
the question 'Is this a chariot?', it is obvious that he will always say
no. And if these pieces are gathered together in a heap, and he is
shown the heap, then also he will say that there is no chariot. If,
finally, he is asked whether apart from these pieces he sees any
chariot, he will still say no. But suppose now that he is shown these
pieces assembled together in such a way that the assemblage can be used
for conveying a man from place to place; when he is asked he will
undoubtedly assert that there is a chariot, that the chariot exists. According to the argument, the man was speaking in the conventional sense when he asserted the existence of the chariot, and in the highest
sense when he denied it. But, clearly enough, the man (who has had no
training in such subtleties) is using ordinary conventional language
throughout; and the reason for the difference between his two statements
is to be found in the fact that on one occasion he was shown a chariot
and on the others he was not. If a chariot is taken to pieces (even in
imagination) it ceases to be a chariot; for a chariot is, precisely, a
vehicle, and a heap of components is not a vehicle—it is a heap
of components. (If the man is shown the heap of components and asked
'Is this a heap of components?', he will say yes.) In other words, a
chariot is most certainly an assemblage of parts, but it is an
assemblage of parts in a particular functional arrangement, and
to alter this arrangement is to destroy the chariot. It is no great
wonder that a chariot cannot be found if we have taken the precaution of
destroying it before starting to look for it. If a man sees a chariot
in working order and says 'In the highest sense there is no chariot; for
it is a mere assemblage of parts', all he is saying is 'It is possible
to take this chariot to pieces and to gather them in a heap; and when
this is done there will no longer be a chariot'. The argument, then,
does not show the non-existence of the chariot; at best it merely
asserts that an existing chariot can be destroyed. And when it is
applied to an individual (i.e. a set of pañcakkhandhā) it is even less valid; for not only does it not show the non-existence of the individual, but since the functional arrangement of the pañcakkhandhā
cannot be altered, even in imagination, it asserts an impossibility,
that an existing individual can be destroyed. As applied to an
individual (or a creature) the argument runs into contradiction; and to
say of an individual 'In the highest sense there is no individual; for
it is a mere asemblage of khandhā' is to be unintelligible.
10.
What, now, is the reason for this argument? Why has this notion of
'truth in the highest sense' been invented? We find the clue in the
Visuddhimagga. This work (Ch. XVIII) quotes the last four lines (5, 6, 7, & 8) and then repeats in essence the argument of the Milindapañha, using the word satta as well as puggala.
It goes on, however, to make clear what was only implicit in the
Milindapañha, namely that the purpose of the argument is to remove the
conceit '(I) am' (asmimāna): if it is seen that 'in the highest sense', paramatthato, no creature exists, there will be no ground for conceiving that I exist. This allows us to understand why the argument was felt to be necessary. The assutavā puthujjana
identifies himself with the individual or the creature, which he
proceeds to regard as 'self'. He learns, however, that the Buddha has
said that 'actually and in truth neither self nor what belongs to self
are to be found' (see the second Sutta passage in §4).
Since he cannot conceive of the individual except in terms of 'self',
he finds that in order to abolish 'self' he must abolish the individual;
and he does it by this device. But the device, as we have seen,
abolishes nothing. It is noteworthy that the passage in the Milindapañha
makes no mention at all of 'self': the identification of 'self' with
the individual is so much taken for granted that once it is established
that 'in the highest sense there is no individual' no further discussion
is thought to be necessary. Not the least of the dangers of the facile
and fallacious notion 'truth in the highest sense' is its power to lull
the unreflecting mind into a false sense of security. The unwary thinker
comes to believe that he understands what, in fact, he does not
understand, and thereby effectively blocks his own progress.
Footnotes:
[a] The question discussed here, whether saccato thetato a 'self' is to be found, must be kept clearly distinct from another question, discussed in A NOTE ON PATICCASAMUPPĀDA §22, viz whether saccato thetato the Tathāgata (or an arahat) is to be found (ditth'eva dhamme saccato thetato Tathāgate anupalabbhamāne... ('since
here and now the Tathāgata actually and in truth is not to be
found...') Avyākata Samy. 2 <S.iv,384>). The reason why the
Tathāgata is not to be found (even here and now) is that he is rūpa-, vedanā-, saññā-, sankhāra-, and viññāna-sankhāya vimutto (ibid. 1
<S.iv,378-9>), i.e. free from reckoning as matter, feeling,
perception, determinations, or consciousness. This is precisely not the case with the puthujjana, who, in this sense, actually and in truth is to be found.
[b] Cf. 'La nature même de notre être répugne à ce qui a des parties et des successions.' --- J. Grenier, Absolu et Choix, P.U.F., Paris 1961, p. 44. ('What has parts and successions is repugnant to the very nature of our being.') [Back to text]
[c] The ditthisampanna (or sotāpanna) is the sattama puggala or 'seventh individual'. Anguttara VI,v,12 <A.iii,373> Nanavira TheraAt Savatthi…. There the Blessed One said this:
“Bhikkhus, I will teach you the burden, the carrier of the burden, the taking up of the burden, and the laying down of the burden. Listen to that….
“And what, bhikkhus, is the burden? It should be said: the five aggregates subject to clinging. What five? The form aggregate subject to clinging, the feeling aggregate subject to clinging, the perception aggregate subject to clinging, the determinations aggregate subject to clinging, the consciousness aggregate subject to clinging. This is called the burden.
“And what, bhikkhus, is the carrier of the burden? It should be said: the person (puggala), this venerable one of such a name and clan. This is called the carrier of the burden.
“And what, bhikkhus, is the taking up of the burden? It is this craving that leads to renewed existence, accompanied by delight and lust, seeking delight here and there; that is, craving for sensual pleasures, craving for existence, craving for extermination. This is called the taking up of the burden.
“And what, bhikkhus, is the laying down of the burden? It is the remainderless fading away and cessation of that same craving, the giving up and relinquishing of it, freedom from it, non-reliance on it. This is called the laying down of the burden.”
This is what the Blessed One said. Having said this, the Fortunate One, the Teacher, further said this:
“The five aggregates are truly burdens,SN 22: 22
The burden-carrier is the person.
Taking up the burden is suffering in the world,
Laying the burden down is blissful.
Having laid the heavy burden down
Without taking up another burden,
Having drawn out craving with its root,
One is free from hunger, fully quenched.”
At Savatthi. Then a certain bhikkhu approached the Blessed One, paid homage to him, sat down to one side, and said to him: “Venerable sir, it would be good if the Blessed One would teach me the Dhamma in brief, so that, having heard the Dhamma from the Blessed One, I might dwell alone, withdrawn, diligent, ardent, and resolute.”
“Bhikkhu, if one has an underlying tendency towards something, then one is reckoned in terms of it. If one does not have an underlying tendency towards something, then one is not reckoned in terms of it.”
“Understood, Blessed One! Understood, Fortunate One!”
“In what way, bhikkhu, do you understand in detail the meaning of what was stated by me in brief?”
“If, venerable sir, one has an underlying tendency towards form, then one is reckoned in terms of it. If one has an underlying tendency towards feeling, then one is reckoned in terms of it. If one has an underlying tendency towards perception, then one is reckoned in terms of it. If one has an underlying tendency towards determinations, then one is reckoned in terms of them. If one has an underlying tendency towards consciousness, then one is reckoned in terms of it.
“If, venerable sir, one does not have an underlying tendency towards form, then one is not reckoned in terms of it. If one does not have an underlying tendency towards feeling … towards perception … towards determinations … towards consciousness, then one is not reckoned in terms of it.
“It is in such a way, venerable sir, that I understand in detail the meaning of what was stated by the Blessed One in brief.”
“Good, good, bhikkhu! It is good that you understand in detail the meaning of what was stated by me in brief. If, bhikkhu, one has an underlying tendency towards form … … then one is not reckoned in terms of it. It is in such a way that the meaning of what was stated by me in brief should be understood in detail.”
Then that bhikkhu, having delighted and rejoiced in the Blessed One’s statement, rose from his seat, and, after paying homage to the Blessed One, keeping him on his right, he departed.
Then, dwelling alone, withdrawn, diligent, ardent, and resolute, that bhikkhu, by realizing it for himself with direct knowledge, in this very life entered and dwelt in that unsurpassed goal of the holy life for the sake of which clansmen rightly go forth from the household life into homelessness. He directly knew: “Destroyed is birth, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this state of being.” And that bhikkhu became one of the arahants.
SN 22: 35
"Venerable sir, concerning the various views that arise in the world — 'The world is eternal' or 'The world isn't eternal'; 'The world is finite' or 'The world is infinite'; 'The soul and the body are the same' or 'The soul is one thing, the body another'; 'A Tathagata exists after death' or 'A Tathagata doesn't exist after death' or 'A Tathagata both exists & doesn't exist after death' or 'A Tathagata neither exists nor doesn't exist after death'; these along with the sixty-two views mentioned in the Brahmajala* — when what is present do these views come into being, and when what is absent do they not come into being?"
When this was said, the senior monk was silent. A second time... A third time Citta the householder asked, "Concerning the various views that arise in the world... when what is present do they come into being, and what is absent do they not come into being?" A third time the senior monk was silent.
Now on that occasion Ven. Isidatta was the most junior of all the monks in that Community. Then he said to the senior monk: "Allow me, venerable sir, to answer Citta the householder's question."
"You may answer it, friend Isidatta."
"Now, householder, are you asking this: 'Concerning the various views that arise in the world... when what is present do they come into being, and what is absent do they not come into being?'?"
"Yes, venerable sir."
"Concerning the various views that arise in the world, householder... when personality (embodiment) view is present, these views come into being; when personality view is absent, they don't come into being."
"But, venerable sir, how does personality view view come into being?"
"There is the case, householder, where an uninstructed commoner — who has no regard for noble ones, is not well-versed or disciplined in their Dhamma; who has no regard for true men, is not well-versed or disciplined in their Dhamma — assumes form to be the self, or the self as possessing form, or form as in the self, or the self as in form. He assumes feeling to be the self, or the self as possessing feeling, or feeling as in the self, or the self as in feeling. He assumes perception to be the self, or the self as possessing perception, or perception as in the self, or the self as in perception. He assumes determinations to be the self, or the self as possessing determinations, or determinations as in the self, or the self as in determinations. He assumes consciousness to be the self, or the self as possessing consciousness, or consciousness as in the self, or the self as in consciousness. This is how personality view comes into being."
"And, venerable sir, how does personality view not come into being?"
"There is the case, householder, where a well-instructed disciple of the noble ones — who has regard for noble ones, is well-versed & disciplined in their Dhamma; who has regard for true men , is well-versed & disciplined in their Dhamma — does not assume form to be the self, or the self as possessing form, or form as in the self, or the self as in form. He does not assume feeling to be the self... He does not assume perception to be the self... He does not assume determinations to be the self... He does not assume consciousness to be the self, or the self as possessing consciousness, or consciousness as in the self, or the self as in consciousness. This is how personality view does not come into being."
SN 41: 3
* One thing among many others to be noticed here is that Buddha is careful to spread a net with which to intercept all speculative views. This is the Brahmajala, the “Divine Net,” which as the first discourse of the whole Sutta Pitaka forms as it were a kind of filter for the mind; or to change the analogy, a tabulation by whose means (if rightly used) all speculative views can be identified, traced down to the fallacy or unjustified assumption from which they spring, and neutralized. This Net, in fact, classifies all possible speculative views (rationalist or irrationalist) under a scheme of sixty-two types.
These 62 types are not descriptions of individual philosophies of other individual teachers contemporary with the Buddha (a number of those are mentioned as well elsewhere in the Suttas), but are the comprehensive net (after revealing the basic assumptions on which these speculative views all grow) with which to catch any wrong viewpoints that can be put forward. (Ultimately, these must all be traceable to the contact of self-identification in some form, however misinterpreted, but that cannot be gone into here.)
* One thing among many others to be noticed here is that Buddha is careful to spread a net with which to intercept all speculative views. This is the Brahmajala, the “Divine Net,” which as the first discourse of the whole Sutta Pitaka forms as it were a kind of filter for the mind; or to change the analogy, a tabulation by whose means (if rightly used) all speculative views can be identified, traced down to the fallacy or unjustified assumption from which they spring, and neutralized. This Net, in fact, classifies all possible speculative views (rationalist or irrationalist) under a scheme of sixty-two types.
These 62 types are not descriptions of individual philosophies of other individual teachers contemporary with the Buddha (a number of those are mentioned as well elsewhere in the Suttas), but are the comprehensive net (after revealing the basic assumptions on which these speculative views all grow) with which to catch any wrong viewpoints that can be put forward. (Ultimately, these must all be traceable to the contact of self-identification in some form, however misinterpreted, but that cannot be gone into here.)
