Words distort thinking, thoughts distort perceiving, percepts distort acting, acts distort being [beings distort naught, that I may be the acting of the perceiving of the thinking of the wording of the question "who?"] Nanamoli Thera
Query: If all things are adjudged as characterized by dukkha, who does the judging? And with reference to what criterion or norm? A subject (immortal soul) with reference to an objective sukha, no? Q.E.D.You ask 'Who does the judging?' This question takes for granted that judging is done 'by somebody'. But this is by no means a foregone conclusion: we are quite able to give an account of judgement (or knowing without finding ourselves obliged to set it up as 'a relation between subject and object'. According to Bradley (and Heidegger, who however is not conveniently quotable, would not entirely dissent), judgement is
the more or less conscious enlargement of an object, not in fact but as truth. The object is thus not altered in existence but qualified in idea.... For the object, merely as perceived, is not, as such, qualified as true. (PL, p. 626)
For Bradley, all inference is an ideal self-development of a real object, and judgement is an implicit inference. (See also SAÑÑĀ, last paragraph.) In my own understanding of the matter, I see knowledge as essentially an act of reflexion, in which the 'thing' to be known presents itself (is presented) explicitly
as standing out against a background (or in a context) that was already
there implicitly. In reflexion, a (limited) totality is given,
consisting of a centre and a periphery—a particular cow appears
surrounded by a number of cattle, and there is the judgement, 'The cow
is in the herd'. Certainly, there is an intention to judge, and
this consists in the deliberate withdrawal of attention from the
immediate level of experience to the reflexive (cf. DHAMMA [b]);
but the question is not whether judgement is an intentional action
(which it is), but whether there can be intention (even reflexive
intention) without a subject ('I', 'myself') who intends. This, however,
is not so much a matter of argument as something that has to be seen
for oneself (cf. CETANĀ [f]).
Of course, since knowledge is very commonly (Heidegger adds 'and
superficially') defined in terms of 'a relation between subject and
object', the question of the subject cannot simply be brushed aside—no
smoke without fire—and we have to see (at least briefly) why it is so
defined. Both Heidegger and Sartre follow Kant in saying that, properly
speaking, there is no knowledge other than intuitive; and I agree. But
what is intuition? From a puthujjana's point of view, it can be
described as immediate contact between subject and object, between
'self' and the 'world' (for how this comes about, I must refer you to PHASSA).
This, however, is not yet knowledge, for which a reflexive
reduplication is needed; but when there is this reflexive reduplication
we then have intuitive knowledge, which is (still for the puthujjana) immediate contact between knowing subject and known object. With the arahat, however, all question of subjectivity has subsided, and we are left simply with (the presence of) the known thing. (It is present, but no longer present 'to somebody'.) So much for judgement in general. Nanavira Thera (from letter)
*
NA CA SO
*
NA CA SO
Na ca so na ca añño,
'Neither he nor another'. This often-quoted dictum occurs in the
Milindapañha somewhere, as the answer to the question 'When a man dies,
who is reborn—he or another?'. This question is quite illegitimate, and
any attempt to answer it cannot be less so. The question, in asking who is reborn, falls into sakkāyaditthi. It takes for granted the validity of the person as 'self'; for it is only about 'self' that this question—'Eternal (so) or perishable (añño)?'—can be asked (cf. PATICCASAMUPPĀDA, ANICCA [a], & SAKKĀYA).
The answer also takes this 'self' for granted, since it allows that the
question can be asked. It merely denies that this 'self' (which must be
either eternal or perishable) is either eternal or perishable, thus
making confusion worse confounded. The proper way is to reject the question in the first place. Compare Anguttara VI,ix,10 <A.iii,440>, where it is said that the ditthisampanna not only can not hold that the author of pleasure and pain was somebody (either himself or another) but also can not hold that the author was not somebody (neither himself nor another). The ditthisampanna sees the present person (sakkāya) as arisen dependent upon present conditions and as ceasing with the cessation of these present conditions. And, seeing this, he does not regard the present person as present 'self'. Consequently, he does not ask the question Who? about the present. By inference—atītānāgate nayam netvā having induced the principle to past and future (cf. Gāmini Samy. 11 <S.iv,328>)[a]—he does not regard the past or future person as past or future 'self', and does not ask the question Who? about the past or the future. (Cf. Māra's question in line 2 of PARAMATTHA SACCA §1.) (The Milindapañha is a particularly misleading book. See also ANICCA [a], PATICCASAMUPPĀDA [c], RŪPA [e], & PARAMATTHA SACCA §§8-10.) Nanavira Thera
At Savatthı̄. “Bhikkhus, there are these four kinds of nutriment for the maintenance of beings that have already come to be and for the assistance of those about to come to be. What four? The nutriment edible food, gross or subtle; second, contact; third, mental volition; fourth, consciousness. These are the four kinds of nutriment for the maintenance of beings that have already come to be and for the assistance of those about to come to be.”
When this was said, the Venerable Moḷiyaphagguna said to the Blessed One: “Venerable sir, who consumes the nutriment consciousness?”
“Not a valid question,” the Blessed One replied. “I do not say, ‘One consumes.’ If I should say, ‘One consumes,’ in that case this would be a valid question: ‘Venerable sir, who consumes?’ But I do not speak thus. Since I do not speak thus, if one should ask me, ‘Venerable sir, for what is the nutriment consciousness ?’ this would be a valid question. To this the valid answer is: ‘The nutriment consciousness is a condition for the production of future renewed existence. When that which has come into being exists, the six sense bases ; with the six sense bases as condition, contact.’”
“Venerable sir, who makes contact?”
“Not a valid question,” the Blessed One replied. “I do not say, ‘One makes contact.’ If I should say, ‘One makes contact,’ in that case this would be a valid question: ‘Venerable sir, who makes contact?’ But I do not speak thus. Since I do not speak thus, if one should ask me, ‘Venerable sir, with what as condition does contact ?’ this would be a valid question. To this the valid answer is: ‘With the six sense bases as condition, contact ; with contact as condition, feeling.’”
“Venerable sir, who feels?”
“Not a valid question,” the Blessed One replied. “I do not say, ‘One feels.’ If I should say, ‘One feels,’ in that case this would be a valid question: ‘Venerable sir, who feels?’ But I do not speak thus. Since I do not speak thus, if one should ask me, ‘Venerable sir, with what as condition does feeling ?’ this would be a valid question. To this the valid answer is: ‘With contact as condition, feeling ; with feeling as condition, craving.’”
“Venerable sir, who craves?”
“Not a valid question,” the Blessed One replied. “I do not say, ‘One craves.’ If I should say, ‘One craves,’ in that case this would be a valid question: ‘Venerable sir, who craves?’ But I do not speak thus. Since I do not speak thus, if one should ask me, ‘Venerable sir, with what as condition does craving ?’ this would be a valid question. To this the valid answer is: ‘With feeling as condition, craving ; with craving as condition, clinging; with clinging as condition, existence.... Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.’
“But, Phagguna, with the remainderless fading away and cessation of the six bases for contact comes cessation of contact; with the cessation of contact, cessation of feeling; with the cessation of feeling, cessation of craving; with the cessation of craving, cessation of clinging; with the cessation of clinging, cessation of existence; with the cessation of existence, cessation of birth; with the cessation of birth, aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair cease. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.”
SN 12: 12
At Savatthı̄. “Bhikkhus, there are these four kinds of nutriment for the maintenance of beings that have already come to be and for the assistance of those about to come to be. What four? The nutriment edible food, gross or subtle; second, contact; third, mental volition; fourth, consciousness. These are the four kinds of nutriment for the maintenance of beings that have already come to be and for the assistance of those about to come to be.”
When this was said, the Venerable Moḷiyaphagguna said to the Blessed One: “Venerable sir, who consumes the nutriment consciousness?”
“Not a valid question,” the Blessed One replied. “I do not say, ‘One consumes.’ If I should say, ‘One consumes,’ in that case this would be a valid question: ‘Venerable sir, who consumes?’ But I do not speak thus. Since I do not speak thus, if one should ask me, ‘Venerable sir, for what is the nutriment consciousness ?’ this would be a valid question. To this the valid answer is: ‘The nutriment consciousness is a condition for the production of future renewed existence. When that which has come into being exists, the six sense bases ; with the six sense bases as condition, contact.’”
“Venerable sir, who makes contact?”
“Not a valid question,” the Blessed One replied. “I do not say, ‘One makes contact.’ If I should say, ‘One makes contact,’ in that case this would be a valid question: ‘Venerable sir, who makes contact?’ But I do not speak thus. Since I do not speak thus, if one should ask me, ‘Venerable sir, with what as condition does contact ?’ this would be a valid question. To this the valid answer is: ‘With the six sense bases as condition, contact ; with contact as condition, feeling.’”
“Venerable sir, who feels?”
“Not a valid question,” the Blessed One replied. “I do not say, ‘One feels.’ If I should say, ‘One feels,’ in that case this would be a valid question: ‘Venerable sir, who feels?’ But I do not speak thus. Since I do not speak thus, if one should ask me, ‘Venerable sir, with what as condition does feeling ?’ this would be a valid question. To this the valid answer is: ‘With contact as condition, feeling ; with feeling as condition, craving.’”
“Venerable sir, who craves?”
“Not a valid question,” the Blessed One replied. “I do not say, ‘One craves.’ If I should say, ‘One craves,’ in that case this would be a valid question: ‘Venerable sir, who craves?’ But I do not speak thus. Since I do not speak thus, if one should ask me, ‘Venerable sir, with what as condition does craving ?’ this would be a valid question. To this the valid answer is: ‘With feeling as condition, craving ; with craving as condition, clinging; with clinging as condition, existence.... Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering.’
“But, Phagguna, with the remainderless fading away and cessation of the six bases for contact comes cessation of contact; with the cessation of contact, cessation of feeling; with the cessation of feeling, cessation of craving; with the cessation of craving, cessation of clinging; with the cessation of clinging, cessation of existence; with the cessation of existence, cessation of birth; with the cessation of birth, aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair cease. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.”
SN 12: 12
